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Post-Racialism and the End of Strict Scrutiny 
DAVID SCHRAUB 
In recent years, a growing social consensus has emerged around the aspiration of a 
“post-racial” America: one where race is no longer a fault line for social strife or, 
perhaps, a morally significant trait whatsoever. This ambition, however, lies in ten-
sion with the most basic constitutional principle governing our treatment of race in 
the public sphere: that of “strict scrutiny.” Post-racialism seeks to diminish the sa-
lience of race to near negligibility. The strict scrutiny of racial classifications, by 
contrast, significantly enhances the salience of race by treating it differently from 
virtually every other personal attribute or characteristic—including hair or eye 
color—extant in our society.  
This Article examines both the emergence of post-racialism and the development 
of the strict scrutiny doctrine in an attempt to resolve the underlying conflict. Both 
the history of strict scrutiny and the conceptual underpinnings of post-racialism in-
dicate that, under the right conditions, racial classifications should stop receiving 
this extraordinary standard of review. Yet advocates of post-racialism have not 
acknowledged that strict scrutiny should have an end date—much less articulated 
the conditions for what that end date might be. The use of strict scrutiny in perpetuity, 
mixed with its uneasy relationship to the post-racial ambition, creates a doctrine that 
is inherently self-defeating. A close look at what we mean by “post-racial,” and how 
we have dealt with similar concerns in other sites of social conflict (for example, sex, 
religion, and indigenous status), can begin the necessary work of determining when 
and whether strict scrutiny should come to an end. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One cannot talk about race in America without talking about “post-racial 
America.” Whether the argument is presented as fait accompli (we are now a post-
racial society) or as an aspiration (we hope to eventually become a post-racial soci-
ety), there is an emergent consensus around post-racialism as the governing metric 
of America’s racial progression. This concept, in turn, has made its mark on 
American law. Chief Justice Roberts gave the standard formulation in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 that “the way ‘to 
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis’ 
is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”1 His was an implied retort 
to Justice Harry Blackmun’s famous defense, in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, of the use of race-conscious admissions decisions in public uni-
versities: namely, that “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account 
of race.”2 Though there is a sharp debate on the process, the end goal is clear: trans-
cending America’s deep history of racial conflict, discrimination, and injustice. 
According strict scrutiny to racial classifications is generally assumed to be an 
adjunct to the desire to become post-racial.3 The logic is intuitive enough: strict scru-
tiny sharply reduces the instances where government can take note of race, and the 
less race is noticed, the more post-racial we are. But in reality, strict scrutiny is a 
policy that exists in deep tension with the post-racialist aspiration. Whereas post-
racialism seeks to diminish (and ultimately eradicate) the special salience of race as 
a political and social category, strict scrutiny provides for race’s exceptional, indeed 
extraordinary, treatment. In contrast to nearly every other point of identity 
orientation—including those, such as hair or eye color, which we hold out as the 
“model” attributes we wish for race to emulate—any appearance of race in public 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)); see also William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: 
Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979) (“[O]ne 
gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible commit-
ment never to tolerate in one’s own life—or in the life or practices of one’s government—the 
differential treatment of other human beings by race.” (emphasis in original)). 
 2. 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, The 
Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2397 
(2000) (“The day when race no longer matters will not arrive until we take active measures, 
or affirmative action, to improve the conditions and remove the disadvantages that keep racial 
minorities down.” (emphasis in original)). 
 3. See, e.g., Derrick Darby, Educational Inequality and the Science of Diversity in 
Grutter: A Lesson for the Reparations Debate in the Age of Obama, 57 KAN. L. REV. 755, 774 
(2009) (“[A]ll uses of race must be subject to strict scrutiny in the post-racial era . . . .”). 
2017] POST-RACIALISM AND THE END OF STRICT SCRUTINY  601 
 
proceedings is subjected to the most exacting judicial scrutiny.4 In theory, this ex-
ceptional treatment should fall away as our society becomes less centered on race 
and racial conflict (that is to say, more “post-racial”). But the legal trend lines do not 
reflect this: as America moves away from de jure racial discrimination, strict scrutiny 
has become more, not less, entrenched. Increasingly, judicial application of strict 
scrutiny in the race context does more to heighten race’s salience than it does to 
minimize racial tensions. 
In other scholarship,5 I have argued that the concept of “perpetual suspect classes” 
is in conflict with the jurisprudential foundations of modern Fourteenth Amendment 
law. Strict scrutiny, as currently practiced, is doctrinally incoherent and normatively 
dangerous—doing more to further the subordination of putatively shielded groups 
than it gives back by way of judicial “protection.” This Article extends that work into 
the broader social philosophy of race—how we as a society envision our racial future 
and what strict scrutiny can and cannot do to take us there. “Post-racialism,” as an 
aspiration, is considerably more complex than many of its proponents give it credit 
for; it does not necessarily imply a society in which race no longer matters. And no 
matter how one understands post-racialism as a concept, it is difficult to see how it 
could be operationalized under a judicial system that continues to devote specialized 
doctrinal attention to race and race alone. Far from conducting the path to a post-
racial future, strict scrutiny—the elevation of race to an exceptional role in American 
law—effectively guarantees we will not “get beyond” race. 
The hesitance of antiracism activists to forthrightly attack strict scrutiny for racial 
classifications is understandable. The use of race in the public sphere has, for nearly 
all of American history, been inextricably tied to structures of power and domina-
tion—it has been the driving force behind immense human misery and inequality. 
The development of strict scrutiny doctrine was crucial in combatting these wrongs. 
But the reticence to move past strict scrutiny—other than by proposing failed half 
measures seeking to exempt “benign” racial classifications from the doctrine’s 
ambit6—has put progressives in an impossible situation. Conservatives have long 
since learned that they can achieve virtually all of their race-related policy objectives 
through mechanisms wholly compatible with strict scrutiny’s demands. Moreover, 
they’ve successfully converted the historical link between race and power into a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any 
sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”). 
 5. David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 363 (2016) [hereinafter Schraub, 
Unsuspecting]; cf. David Schraub, The Siren Song of Strict Scrutiny, 84 UMKC L. REV. 859 
(2016) [hereinafter Schraub, Siren Song] (arguing that suspect classification of sexual orien-
tation could do more harm than good). 
 6. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1990) (refusing to apply 
strict scrutiny to “benign race-conscious measures”), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial 
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 575 (1975) (arguing that it 
would be a mistake to apply the normal strict-scrutiny approach to benign classifications); 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of 
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 
691–93 (arguing that only caste-reinforcing racial classifications burden politically vulnerable 
groups and thus should be subjected to strict scrutiny). 
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transcendent critique of any and all uses of race—sabotaging race-conscious progres-
sive reform efforts.7 Today, strict scrutiny is almost exclusively deployed against 
progressive efforts to ameliorate racialized injustice.8 Having successfully enlisted 
strict scrutiny against progressive racial legislations, conservatives have managed to 
obscure the deep incoherency latent in their own program—a “post-racial” world in 
which race occupies a central, hallowed, and timeless place in constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
There is a way out. One need not get beyond racism simply by eliminating race 
as a category. A coherent “post-racial” agenda could instead envision something 
more radical still: a world in which race no longer is a force of marginalization and 
exclusion. Instead of perpetually policing “dangerous” characteristics in the hopes 
that they disappear, this sort of post-racialism normalizes them—race is integrated 
into ordinary politics and society without being especially perilous or fraught. Instead 
of demanding erasure and assimilation, this vision of post-racialism is of “equality 
among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one an-
other and affirm one another in their differences.”9 This understanding is less alien 
than it seems: it is, after all, already the main conception of religious equality. We 
overcome religious discrimination not by envisioning a world where “Jew” and 
“Muslim” disappear as categories but rather a world where Jews and Muslims and 
persons of all religious backgrounds can partake openly in democratic politics with-
out fear that their identities will be leveraged against them or harnessed for oppres-
sive ends. 
It may seem strange to think of the end of racialized oppression as being a world 
in which race is simply a “normal” attribute of democratic politics—to be used or 
not as we please. But I suggest that this is the true apotheosis of equality. As a Jew, 
I enjoy a welter of protections under state and federal law protecting me from dis-
crimination and animus. As a left-handed person, I possess none of these things. Yet 
there is no doubt I am more socially vulnerable as a Jew than as a lefty—the omission 
of “left-handedness” as a protected legal category reflects not marginalization but 
the absence of any systematic efforts to place that identity under serious threat.10 And 
so it is in general: true equality is not the existence of formal barriers against hurt or 
wrong—no matter how high or impregnable. Equality comes when equality is 
normal—so normal that you don’t have to be perpetually on your guard to defend it. 
So normal that it wouldn’t occur to anyone to try and take it away. 
Following this introduction, this Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I explore 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1768 (1993) 
(complaining that “at the very historical moment that race is infused with a perspective that 
reshapes it, through race-conscious remediation, into a potential weapon against subordina-
tion, official rules articulated in law deny that race matters” (emphasis in original)). 
 8. Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 392 (characterizing strict scrutiny as applying 
only to a “rump remainder” of racially inflected legislation). 
 9. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 163 (1990). 
 10. Nor can the distinction be drawn on the basis that we never “use” left-handedness on 
a social basis. Nobody has a problem with a public university being sure to provide some left-
handed desks in the classroom or to make available a few left-handed golf clubs for rent. 
Lefties are not equal because society is “blind” to the category; they’re equal because society 
can be trusted to deploy the category without tying it to a system of subordination. 
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the concept of post-racialism. Post-racialism is a descriptive (or aspirational) claim 
about the salience of race in the public sphere—it describes the ends, not the means. 
The core of the post-racial instinct is a desire to transcend a racially stained past. The 
goal is to create an America which is not under the legacy of and does not risk repli-
cating our history of racial oppression. But this ambition can be formulated in two 
ways. The standard account argues that a post-racial America is one where race has 
disappeared entirely, leaving no trace on American life or law. Yet there is also an 
alternative conception of post-racialism that envisions race as normalized—not car-
rying any special risk or peril compared to other human characteristics, leaving it up 
to individual persons and communities to determine whether it still possesses mean-
ing or utility.  
Part II explores the underlying tension between post-racialism and applying strict 
scrutiny to racial categorization. Doctrinally, there are a few narrowly delineated jus-
tifications for the usage of racial categories. But the standard reasons offered for pre-
serving race-based strict scrutiny do not meet them—in this way, the justification for 
strict scrutiny collapses in on itself. Moreover, socially speaking there is ample rea-
son to be skeptical that such a drastic and visible statement about race’s continued 
importance is compatible with a nation that can honestly be said to have gotten “be-
yond race.” Whatever post-racialism means, it surely cannot describe a society in 
which the full force and fury of the legal establishment stands ready to come crashing 
down at even the slightest whiff of race. In other words, in order to get beyond race, 
we must cease treating race as a special arena of judicial empowerment. 
Finally, Part III explores three ways of resolving the paradox. The first is to aban-
don strict scrutiny entirely and truly treat race like eye or hair color. A “post-racial” 
jurisprudence of constitutional law would thus look dramatically different from that 
forwarded by the current Supreme Court majority. Even a jurisprudence where we 
began rolling racial scrutiny back—treating it more akin to sex (and thus giving it 
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny protection)—would see some important doc-
trinal changes, most notably in the usage of “benign” racial classifications. The sec-
ond is abandoning the dream of post-racialism. This may counsel the reemergence 
of race-conscious policy making, but then, it may not. The potency of the color-
blindness principle, after all, is not necessarily dependent on it actually getting us 
beyond race. Race may always be with us; but it’s entirely possible that color-
blindness represents the best chance at mitigating the dangers associated with it. 
Abandoning post-racialism, in other words, doesn’t prescribe a policy, but shifts the 
question from “how do we transcend race” to “how do we manage it.” 
The final option is that we rearticulate the meaning of post-racialism itself. Re-
turning to the second model of post-racialism presented in Part I, I argue that the 
underlying motivator behind the post-racialism instinct is to get beyond the fear of 
race as a category—the paralyzing belief that any time race appears in our society, it 
necessarily is the harbinger of ethnic strife or the resurrection of Jim Crow. Color-
blindness suppresses the demon, but it does not and cannot eradicate it. However, 
other options exist. For example, many defend a vision of “getting beyond” religious 
discrimination without demanding the total public suppression of religion as a cate-
gory (indeed, such suppression would be seen as deeply hostile to our ideas of reli-
gious freedom). The goal of American race jurisprudence (and broader antiracism 
practice) should not be to suppress race but to enable the public appearance of race 
without the corresponding fear of hierarchy or domination. 
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I wish to be very clear about the scope of my project. In articulating the vision of 
post-racialism that I do—where race is no longer a fraught identity feature laden by 
the omnipresent risk of hierarchy and subordination—I do not intend to suggest that 
we can achieve this ambition simply by force of will or through a few tweaks in our 
attitudes towards the proper role of race in society. Post-racialism, under my under-
standing or any other, will not be achieved “by proclamation alone.”11 The goal is 
rather to clarify what it is we are—or should be—pursuing when we say we want to 
be “post-racial,” even if the ideal we settle upon feels quite distant. Just as Elizabeth 
Anderson asked, “What’s the point of equality?”,12 we should ask, “What’s the point 
of post-racialism?” Answering that question does not itself bring us closer to the 
ideal, but it can clarify how our current practices are or are not viable as strategies 
for attaining it. And accordingly my critique of strict scrutiny stems not from a belief 
that we have achieved post-racialism but for the remnant artifact of the ancien ré-
gime, but rather from a concern that we remain quite far from a society where race 
ceases to be a site of fear and domination and that contemporary strict scrutiny doc-
trine is pushing us further away still. 
I. TWO MODELS OF POST-RACIALISM 
What does post-racialism mean? Before we answer that, it is essential to answer 
a preliminary question: what sort of concept is post-racialism?13 In my view, post-
racialism is best understood as an aspiration, not a prescription.14 That is to say, post-
racialism is an answer to the question: “What should America look like with respect 
to race?” But it does not necessarily imply a particular strategy of how to get there 
(and, of course, it does not imply that we have already attained the aspiration). While 
many believe that a policy of strict colorblindness is the best route towards the goal 
of a post-racial society, others dissent from this outlook—for example, Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (1988) (“Practi-
cally speaking, all companies can now be equal opportunity employers by proclamation alone. 
Society has embraced the rhetoric of equal opportunity without fulfilling its promise . . . .”). 
 12. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999). 
 13. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDIES 12–13 
(1980) (distinguishing between four separate questions regarding the theoretical import of 
race: (1) the actual, current role race plays in American life (and our collective understandings 
regarding the same); (2) what causes or has caused this reality to emerge; (3) what the ideal 
state of affairs with respect to race in our society should be; and (4) what instrumentalities we 
ought to pursue in moving from the status quo to the ideal); Tommie Shelby, Racism, 
Moralism, and Social Criticism, 11 DU BOIS REV. 57, 57 (2014) (holding out four different 
articulations of what might be meant by post-racial, ranging from social scientific consensus 
that “race” is an incoherent concept to an “ironic[]” statement that it is no longer socially 
acceptable to criticize ongoing racist inequalities).  
 14. See Derrick Darby & Argun Saatcioglu, Race, Justice, and Desegregation, 11 DU 
BOIS REV. 87, 93 (2014) (“The least controversial [interpretation of post-racialism] is that it 
expresses an aspiration regarding the kind of society we hope to become, namely one where a 
person’s race does not constitute a barrier to equality of opportunity or to the fruits of 
citizenship.”). 
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Blackmun in Bakke.15 And, likewise, one can support colorblindness as a policy mat-
ter without any corresponding belief that it will necessarily lead to a post-racial 
world—for example, under the belief it is necessary to mitigate (though not trans-
cend) racial strife and discrimination in a world in which race remains very 
relevant.16 
This isn’t to say that post-racialism and colorblindness are usually disconnected. 
Much the opposite: both are probably the dominant viewpoints in America within 
their respective domains—the orthodox view of racial jurisprudence (at least 
amongst American Whites) is to pursue a strategy of colorblindness to eventually 
reach a world in which race is irrelevant. But there is use in maintaining the concep-
tual distinction. The policies by which we pursue our ideals are not the same thing 
as the ideals themselves. And, as will be argued below, the doctrinal use of strict 
scrutiny with respect to race exists in deep tension with the ideal of post-racialism. 
Within this descriptive framework, I forward two alternative conceptions of the 
meaning of post-racialism. One model, probably the dominant one, imagines a world 
where race is never used—where it, in effect, ceases to exist. This proposal aligns 
itself with the constitutional doctrine of colorblindness and strict scrutiny—both le-
galized efforts to drastically limit, if not obliterate, the usage of race in American 
life. A second conception of post-racialism runs orthogonal to this view. Though it, 
too, entails a dramatic reduction in the salience of race, it endeavors not to make race 
disappear but to make it like any other (nondangerous) characteristic extant in the 
populace. Race would no longer be special; it would no longer maintain its unique 
grip on the American psyche or American law. Under this view, doctrines like strict 
scrutiny are aberrational, for they maintain race’s superordinate status in seeming 
perpetuity. But this view does not demand race never be used at all. The norm of 
democratic politics is precisely that the people are free to decide how to express their 
various identity characteristics in the public sphere and are likewise given substantial 
flexibility in determining when and how to use such characteristics as part of the 
political toolbox available for resolving social problems. 
These concepts are in tension—but they share a unifying core. In both cases, the 
motivating instinct beyond the desire to be “post-racial” is a desire to neutralize the 
seeming peril and danger of race. Race is the source and subject of some of 
America’s most grievous social sins. Americans of all backgrounds and politics wish 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also WASSERSTROM, supra note 13, at 
51–77 (forwarding as the proper ideal with respect to race and sex a world in which both 
characteristics cease to be relevant but vigorously defending the justness and necessity of a 
system of racial and sexual preferential treatment as a means to that end); Alison Jaggar, On 
Sexual Equality, 84 ETHICS 275, 286 (1974) (observing that the belief that sexual separatism 
“is a necessary step on the way” to sexual equality does not, in and of itself, challenge the 
notion of “sexual integration as an ideal”). 
 16. See, e.g., LAWRIE BALFOUR, EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SAID: JAMES BALDWIN AND THE 
PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2001) (arguing against heightening the public salience 
of race to combat racism because “[p]erhaps . . . the subtler, subterranean forms of racism that 
lurk beneath the surface of public discourse ought to be left undisturbed. For what surfaces as 
frankness may simply be expressions of racism, formerly discredited, reemerging in a new 
guise.”); infra notes 244–47 and accompanying text (arguing that Justice Thomas’s views 
correspond to this position). 
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not to replicate them and thus desire the creation of a racial state of affairs that—as 
greatly as possible—eliminates that risk.  
 A. The First Model: Making Race Disappear 
In its simplest form, the first model of post-racialism appeals to the intuitive in-
stinct that the easiest way for the problem of racism to go away would be for race to 
go away as well.17 The ideal of race is that it becomes something “invisible” or ir-
relevant, like hair or eye color.18 While, of course, discriminatory classification on 
the basis of race is offensive, the first model of post-racialism goes deeper to object 
to any government or social act that renders race salient.19 
This idea of post-racialism is obviously heavily bound up with the strategy of 
colorblindness. Sumi Cho forwards that post-racialism is best understood as a pro-
posed “retreat from race.”20 This retreat, she argues, diminishes several aspects of 
contemporary civil rights practice: it eliminates race-based material-support pro-
grams like affirmative action, refuses to grant special normative status to how people 
of color conceptualize the current state of racial affairs and what is needed to achieve 
racial justice, and rejects race as a valid focal point for collective political action.21 
Just as it would be strange (to say the least) for programs or political behavior to 
focus or center around the color of one’s hair, we’re told, it is equally unsupportable 
to center them around the color of one’s skin. 
The analogy to such visible but morally innocuous attributes like eye color, or the 
first letter of one’s last name, is compelling.22 As the Supreme Court put it in Miller 
v. Johnson, the very essence of the American social compact is that “the Government 
must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not “as simply components of a racial, religious, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 
789 (2009) (conceding the “intuitive logic to this assumption” while arguing that “it turns 
out . . . often clearly wrong”). 
 18. WASSERSTROM, supra note 13, at 24 (“[O]ne conception of a nonracist society . . . 
would be one in which the race of an individual would be the functional equivalent of the eye 
color of individuals in our society today.”); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee 
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 
1171 (2006) (“[T]he most straightforward account [of what it means to be racially unbiased] 
would require one to accord race no more significance than, say, eye or hair color . . . .”). 
 19. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) (objecting 
to the use of racial quotas “in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make race 
irrelevant”); R. Richard Banks, “Nondiscriminatory” Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 
76 B.U. L. REV. 669, 690 (1996) (book review) (“If race is morally irrelevant, the individuals 
who constitute a morally upright society and that society's state apparatus should both be color-
blind. The moral ideal of colorblindness thus embodies the vision of a colorblind state as well 
as a colorblind society.”). 
 20. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1593–94 (2009) (citing DANA Y. 
TAKAGI, THE RETREAT FROM RACE: ASIAN-AMERICAN ADMISSIONS AND RACIAL POLITICS (1992)). 
 21. Id. at 1594–97. 
 22. David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 117 (conceding 
that “[t]here is enormous appeal to the ideal of a society in which race is as insignificant a 
factor as eye color”). 
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sexual or national class.”’”23 The idea that anything of significance should turn upon 
something as morally arbitrary as skin color is as absurd as it turning on any other 
fluke of phenotype. While at present race may still have a social significance that 
requires its (limited) use in governmental programs, this is a temporary state of af-
fairs—a concession to a historical evil that (hopefully soon) will be vanquished for 
good.24 Given that the American categories of race have little (if any) biological ba-
sis,25 what utility is there in permanently preserving race as a category at all? In this 
model of post-racialism, there is none. 
Consider the Seattle desegregation program struck down in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.26 Seattle generally allowed pu-
pils to enroll in whichever school within the district they wished; however, for 
schools that were oversubscribed, the district considered integration concerns as a 
“tiebreaker.”27 For oversubscribed schools whose racial composition had strayed 
from the overall district demographics, the district’s tiebreaker “selects for assign-
ment students whose race ‘will serve to bring the school into balance.’”28 If the 
school was predominantly White (as was the case in three high schools), this would 
favor non-White applicants; if the school was predominantly non-White (as was the 
case in one high school), this would favor White applicants.29 And if a school’s en-
rollment was in line with the district’s overall demographics (as was the case in one 
high school), neither race would be favored.30 
Seattle’s program did not intrinsically favor one race—it was not racially “dis-
criminatory” in the classic sense, even “benignly” so.31 It did not, for example, say 
that because African Americans had faced a history of discrimination, they would be 
given general preference over White students in the event a school was over-
subscribed.32 Nor did it cause the admission of less-qualified applicants over more-
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 24. See infra note 110. 
 25. K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in COLOR 
CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30, 73 (K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Gutmann 
eds., 1996) (“I have no problem with people who want to use the word ‘race’ in population 
genetics. . . . The trouble is that . . . while there are human populations that are and have been 
for some time relatively reproductively isolated, it is not at all plausible to claim that any social 
subgroup in the United States is such a population.”). 
 26. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 27. Id. at 711–12. 
 28. Id. at 712 (quoting the record). 
 29. Id. at 713. 
 30. Id. 
 31. A “benign” racial classification is one that favors a disadvantaged racial minority for 
seemingly salutary purposes—for example, political inclusion or compensation for social dis-
crimination. While at one point these classifications received only intermediate scrutiny, 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 & n.12 (1990), now they are treated as 
identical to racial classifications which are designed to promote inequality, Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 32. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003) (noting that racial minorities were 
given a relatively large, though not decisive, preference in a competitive admission environ-
ment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
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qualified competitors (as enrollment decisions in Seattle are not meant to be evalua-
tions of students’ “merit”).33 And it expressed favoritism towards neither White nor 
non-White students, though of course in the context of individual schools either 
might end up being in a favored or disfavored position. The program was, in the 
words of the Washington Supreme Court, “race-cognizant but racially neutral.”34 Yet 
the U.S. Supreme Court still applied strict scrutiny35 and still ruled the program 
unlawful.36 
From the vantage of contemporary Supreme Court doctrine, however, 
Washington’s formulation of “race-cognizant but racially neutral” is in-
comprehensible gibberish. Any race-conscious governmental act is inherently ra-
cially charged and thus subject to intense judicial surveillance.37 “Government action 
dividing us by race is inherently suspect because such classifications promote ‘no-
tions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.’”38 The very act of 
using race—even in manners that appear facially nondiscriminatory—is itself mor-
ally and socially pernicious.39 This theme was also present in Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence, which expressed considerable concern at the negative effects of being 
“forced to live under a state-mandated racial label.”40 The Court’s rhetoric seems 
intentionally agnostic towards how race is used—the problem and the danger is that 
race is used at all. More importantly, its objection seems to be both one of ends as 
well as means: It is not simply the case that the Court predicts race-conscious politi-
cal programs will lead to racial strife. It is that it sees something inherently degrading 
in race being a salient player in American life at all.41 
The Supreme Court is hardly the only political institution to adopt this outlook. 
                                                                                                                 
 
J.) (striking down a quota program which restricted White applicants to competing for “84 
seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants”) 
 33. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 166 
(Wash. 2003) (en banc), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 834 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the challenged programs “do not seek to award a scarce 
commodity on the basis of merit, for they are not magnet schools; rather, by design and in 
practice, they offer substantially equivalent academic programs and electives”). 
 34. Parents Involved, 72 P.3d at 156 (parentheses omitted). 
 35. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (“It is well established that when the government 
distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is 
reviewed under strict scrutiny.”). 
 36. Id. at 748. 
 37. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (demanding the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to “all governmental action based on race” (emphasis added)). 
 38. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (plurality opinion) (quoting City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
 39. Id. at 745–46 (“[D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality.” (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214)). 
 40. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 41. Id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[E]very time the government places citizens on 
racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us 
all.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 253 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part))). 
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Take the recent Arizona statute42 targeting high school ethnic studies programs, re-
sulting in the termination of Tucson’s Mexican Studies class and the banning of 
books where “race, ethnicity and oppression are central themes.”43 Though such 
courses are obviously race-conscious (as race and ethnicity are their explicit subject 
matter), they do not in and of themselves discriminate between races or treat one race 
differently than another. But, opponents argue, simply raising race as an important 
issue is enough: by priming students to think of themselves in racial terms, such pro-
grams create “groupthink” and stoke racial division where none (they claim) had 
existed before.44 The state school superintendent thus argued that ethnic studies pro-
grams, as a whole, “are designed to promote ethnic chauvinism” and are inherently 
inconsistent with America’s individualist ethos.45 Post-racialism, understood in this 
way, has no place for race playing any role in American public life—regardless of 
who, how, or what it is being used for—because the usage of race itself is the problem 
we are trying to get beyond.46  
It is important to disentangle two distinct positions that could be being forwarded 
here. The first is simply that of contemporary prescription. The general prohibition 
on the usage of race is an assessment that, given the current state of affairs with 
respect to race, our society cannot maintain any semblance of equal opportunity or 
racial harmony if race is allowed into the picture. But, in another context where cir-
cumstances are different, that might not be true—a society where racial tensions had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-112(A) (2014) (prohibiting courses which, among other 
things, are “designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group” or which “[a]dvocate 
ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals”), invalidated in part by Arce 
v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015). In 2015, the Ninth Circuit reinstated a legal chal-
lenge to the statute asserting that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Arce, 793 
F.3d at 990. 
 43. Jeff Biggers, Who’s Afraid of “The Tempest”?, SALON (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:47 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/13/whos_afraid_of_the_tempest/ [https://perma.cc/X2AV-LVEH]. 
The banned books ranged from Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed to Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Stephen Ceasar, Tucson Students Confront Loss of Their Chicano Studies 
Class, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/11/nation/la-na-ethnic 
-studies-20120112 [https://perma.cc/C3EC-C3ZX] (citing objections that the program “pro-
motes groupthink and victimhood”); Mark Lacey, Rift in Arizona as Latino Class Is Found 
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08ethnic.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y6MZ-64BA] (citing one teacher as claiming that “[o]n the first day of 
school, they are no different than students in any other classes . . . . But once they get told day 
after day that they are being victimized, they become angry and resentful”). 
 45. Arizona Legislature Passes Bill To Curb ‘Chauvanism’ in Ethnic Studies Programs, 
FOX NEWS (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/30/arizona-legislature 
-passes-banning-ethnic-studies-programs.html [https://perma.cc/828A-5LU5] (quoting state 
school superintendent Tom Horne). 
 46. See Cynthia V. Ward, Commentary, The Limits of “Liberal Republicanism”: Why 
Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don’t Mix, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 606 
(1991) (arguing generally that interest-group pluralism on race or sex lines is “communo-
pathic,” destroying the capacity of the polity to engage in collective problem solving while 
attuned to the needs and interests of all and instead fostering—even demanding—the view that 
disparate groups are locked in a perpetual state of provincial political warfare). 
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seriously receded or where race was not considered a major point of conflict may 
well be able to tolerate certain public uses of race without there being any problem 
at all. It is a discussion over means, not ends.47 
But it seems like the proponents of the first model are often making a more ex-
pansive claim about the type of society we should aspire to be.48 When they talk 
about the inherent indignity of being sorted into a racial category,49 or the necessarily 
“chauvinistic” character of a focus on questions of race or ethnicity,50 they are talking 
not just of process but of end goals. They are not just promoting, as a provisional 
tactical matter, policies and doctrines that limit the use of race. They aspire to a world 
where race effectively no longer exists—where it is as if race never “happened.”51 
The problem is that—appealing or not—this vision may not be translatable into a 
legal doctrine. After all, this view of race—where it is effectively exiled from every 
nook and cranny of American society—cannot countenance any use of race, includ-
ing those necessary to instantiate legal doctrines such as strict scrutiny.52 Maintaining 
a system of government-mandated colorblindness requires a relatively thick social 
conception of race (else how would we know what is prohibited?) and a constant 
state of public vigilance to guard against the (re)infection of race thinking. This 
stands in stark contradiction to a world where race has, in fact, disappeared from 
view entirely. 
This is not to say such a vision is entirely untenable. Indeed, below I will offer a 
model of an identity characteristic that once was considered a serious social danger 
in America but has since faded to obscurity.53 Rather, the point is that this vision 
necessitates a severely circumscribed legal role—it requires us to at least contem-
plate “the end of strict scrutiny.” If the strong arm of the law is indefinitely necessary 
to maintain this sort of post-racialism, then it cannot be said that race has actually 
disappeared. 
B. The Second Model: Normalizing Race 
While the promise of making race disappear has considerable force, it is not the 
only response Americans have been able to imagine with respect to historically dan-
gerous identities. Another way of conceptualizing post-racialism is not as a world 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. See infra Part III.B (defending perpetual use of strict scrutiny in a world where racial 
conflict is admitted to be an inalterable fact of the American social sphere). 
 48. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (arguing that post-racialism is an aspi-
ration, not a prescription). 
 49. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
 51. TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI & KIAN M. KWAN, ETHNIC STRATIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 589 (1965) (arguing that “it is only a matter of time before a more enlightened 
citizenry” recognizes that ethnic identity is a fiction and “will become a thing of the past”); 
see also Michael Walzer, Preface to JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW, at v, xx 
(George J. Becker trans., 1995) (describing Sartre’s long-term vision as a “society where 
groups no longer exist to be oppressed and marginalized”). 
 52. See infra Part II. 
 53. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the trajectory of how questions of hereditary privi-
leges and preferences are treated in American law and society). 
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without race but as a world in which race is normalized—just another facet of human 
identity, without distinctive legal treatment or presumed social peril. 
The analogy to hair or eye color is illustrative here as well. In most places and 
across the broader spectrum of American constitutional law, race and physical ap-
pearance (or other qualities we think of as exemplifying “benign” characteristics) are 
treated nothing alike.54 Race-conscious policies are subjected to strict scrutiny—the 
most searching and stringent inquiry in American constitutional law. Eye color, by 
contrast, is not a protected class at all—a law distinguishing on the basis of eye color 
would face only the extremely relaxed hurdle of overcoming rational basis scrutiny. 
A person with no knowledge of our history with racial discrimination—someone 
who truly did see race and eye color as equally (un)important—would be baffled by 
the immense difference in how contemporary antidiscrimination law treats the two 
categories.55 And, despite the ubiquity of claiming that race ought to be as relevant 
as any other phenotype, claims that we should actually treat them legally alike—in 
other words, that discrimination based on appearance should gain the full force and 
protection of our antidiscrimination doctrines—are typically met with derision.56 
There are near-infinite bases upon which the government can elect to classify, and 
the vast majority of them are subjected to only a minimal, “rational basis” review.57 
Race is treated differently for perfectly sensible reasons: the unique historical sa-
lience of racial discrimination in particular renders it trivializing to say that discrim-
ination on the basis of eye color is of an equivalent moral gravity to a form of dis-
crimination that has manifested in slavery, in segregated social spaces, and in lynch 
mobs.58 The past (and present) prevalence of racial bigotry and prejudice conjure 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE 
AND LAW 125–34 (2010) (canvassing the limited number of American jurisdictions which 
have passed laws restricting appearance-based discrimination). 
 55. Strauss, supra note 22, at 112 (observing that “the truly colorblind actor, the prover-
bial person from Mars to whom racial discrimination is a totally alien concept” would find 
incomprehensible the difference in how we treat race versus eye color). 
 56. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD 159 (2008) (dismissing the ne-
cessity of anti-discrimination laws targeting weight, attractiveness, or physical appearance); 
WALTER OLSON, SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE: LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN OVERLAWYERED AMERICA 
5 (2011) (mocking academic efforts to more robustly combat “appearance-based discrimina-
tion”); ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 46 (1995) (noting the “slippery slope which 
stretches from . . . ethnic minorities . . . to take in . . . people with blue eyes and red hair”).  
Even writers who agree that appearance-based discrimination is a real and serious phenom-
enon are skeptical of adopting legal prohibitions akin to race-discrimination doctrine. See 
Enbar Toledano, May the Best (Looking) Man Win: The Unconscious Role of Attractiveness 
in Employment Decisions, CORNELL HR REV., Feb. 14, 2013, at 9, http://digitalcommons.ilr 
.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=chrr [https://perma.cc/93BW-7FV8] 
(noting the wide body of research supporting the presence of discrimination based on 
attractiveness, but concluding that rendering “such judgments illegal would . . . prove 
unreasonable and ineffective”). 
 57. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
 58. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 977 (2010) (noting that the past use of racial categories has 
“hardened consequences”); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 
HOW. L.J. 1, 42 (1995) (“[T]he long history of the disadvantages suffered by racial minorities 
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“special fears that [racial classifications] are motivated by an invidious purpose.”59 
Meanwhile, for better or for worse, our identities are considerably more bound up in 
racial categories than they are in eye-color categories, and that necessitates a more 
wary approach to grappling with racial discrimination than discrimination on the ba-
sis of appearance.60 
Under this view, we know race remains a problem precisely because it resists 
retreating back into its superficial unimportance. Consider a typical method for 
quickly sorting large groups of people: the use of the first letter of their last name. 
This, of course, is not considered particularly controversial. Nor does it signal that 
we as a society are particularly “conscious” of how our names our spelled. Much the 
opposite—the ability to use this sorting mechanism is possible precisely because al-
phabetical order is exceedingly unimportant—it is a normal, unremarkable part of 
our life, one which occasionally turns out to have bearing on social organization and 
interaction. Meanwhile, all persons might agree that the color of my skin is no more 
morally relevant than the fact that my last name begins with the letter S. Yet we very 
much see a difference between being sorted into the “M–Z” line at the DMV com-
pared to the DMV creating (literal) race lines. This distinction in social meaning 
comes from the knowledge that race still has a great deal of salience; thus, the cate-
gory cannot be used wholly innocuously. It always conjures up a sense of peril and 
danger, even in situations where conceptually analogous criteria could be used with 
little concern. 
The aspiration of a second-model post-racial world would be one in which these 
characteristics no longer attach to race. The normalization of race would represent a 
world in which the seemingly unique peril that surrounds race will have faded away. 
In such a world, people may choose to reference, associate around, or otherwise make 
use of race—or they may not. Unlike the first model of post-racialism, which seeks 
to utterly annihilate racial difference, the second model follows Theodor Adorno’s 
recommendation to pursue not “a unitary state, but the realization of universality in 
the reconciliation of differences.”61 The point is that because race became just like 
any other characteristic—no more or no less dangerous—it likewise became anach-
ronistic (if not counterproductive) to subject it to special rules and restrictions. 
This perspective is not limited to characteristics that lack a significant history of 
prejudice and oppression tied to their name. Consider religion, gender, or sexual ori-
entation. Religion is an obvious example of an identity towards which pluralism is 
often defended as a qualitatively superior response to the problems of discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 
in the United States . . . is what accounts for the cultural significance of race, and it is what 
makes race different from eye color or hair color.”); James Lileks, Equality for the, Uh, 
Different, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 19, 1992, at 25A (arguing, in the context of a pro-
posed Santa Cruz ordinance which would bar discrimination based on appearance, that the law 
“puts hair color and skin color on the same moral plane”).  
 59. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). 
 60. WASSERSTROM, supra note 13, at 14–15 (observing that, while one can imagine a so-
ciety in which race, like eye color, was simply a matter of superficial physiology, the particular 
social and cultural history of race in our society prevents us from simply incorporating our 
hypothetical treatment of eye-color difference into the race context). 
 61. THEODOR ADORNO, MINIMA MORALIA: REFLECTIONS ON A DAMAGED LIFE 103 (E.F.N. 
Jephcott trans., Verso 2005) (1951). 
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and bigotry. The goal of religious-equality advocates is almost never to eliminate 
religious difference; rather, it is to create conditions where religious difference can 
be expressed and preserved without resulting in any hostile treatment or discrimina-
tion. Sometimes, this is a simple, pragmatic calculation that the costs of creating re-
ligious orthodoxy (or eliminating religion altogether) are not worth the amount of 
conflict it would provoke.62 For others, religious pluralism itself might be considered 
valuable and good.63 With respect to sex, there has been a significant debate as to 
whether sex difference is something to be valued or disposed of, with both “left” and 
“right” theorists present on both sides of the divide.64 The greater willingness in so-
ciety and the courts to accept at least the possibility of sex difference gave women’s 
advocates considerably more flexibility in promoting sex-discrimination doctrines 
that went beyond formal-equality models.65 And sexual orientation might present the 
clearest case of all, with Andrew Sullivan’s landmark call for gay rights holding forth 
a world wherein gay and lesbian identity is present but entirely normalized, no longer 
considered to be exceptional or aberrant.66 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. WASSERSTROM, supra note 13, at 27 (asserting that even those who might prefer a 
unitary state of religious affairs might still believe “that the evils of achieving anything like 
homogeneity far outweighed the possible benefits”); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 
CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3 (2008) (noting the “Hobbesian” case for permitting religious hetero-
doxy—that the costs of religious warfare render it unfeasible to impose a single, orthodox 
view on the matter). 
 63. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 13, at 27; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise 
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1139 (1990) (“The ideal of free 
exercise of religion . . . is that people of different religious convictions are different and that 
those differences are precious and must not be disturbed. . . . The ideal of free exercise is 
counter-assimilationist; it strives to allow individuals of different religious faiths to maintain 
their differences in the face of powerful pressures to conform.”). Wasserstrom and McConnell 
contrast this perspective to how we ought to view race, but of course this is precisely the nature 
of the dispute itself. See id. at 1139 & n.132; supra note 15. 
 64. See Jaggar, supra note 15, at 276–77 (recounting the traditional feminist viewpoint 
that a “nonsexist society is one which is totally integrated sexually, one in which sexual dif-
ferences have ceased to be a matter of public concern,” while noting the growing challenge to 
this perspective from within the feminist movement). Within Christian and particularly 
Catholic feminist thought, a “new feminism” that seeks to note the complementarity, rather 
than the interchangeability, of the sexes has emerged as an important statement regarding what 
(in the view of the Church) sex equality means. See generally WOMEN IN CHRIST: TOWARD A 
NEW FEMINISM (Michele M. Schumacher ed., 2004). Christina Hoff Sommers is probably the 
most prominent theorist identified broadly with the “right” who promotes a “sex-blind” con-
ception of sexual equality. See CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM?: HOW 
WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN 22 (1994) (attacking what she refers to as “gender femi-
nism” as lacking grassroots support and being divorced from the original, “First Wave” 
feminist movement which concentrated on securing formal equality to men).  
 65. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 229 (2011) (“Paradoxically, sex equality law became a promising template in 
part because the perception that men and women were inherently different meant that many 
judges did not see formal equality as an option. . . . [F]eminists persuaded the Court to distin-
guish between . . . ‘invidious’ classifications and ‘genuine affirmative action’ [and] used 
[these] principles to combat the rise of colorblindness.”). 
 66. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 
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The “sex-conscious” or “religion-conscious” advocates certainly do not want to 
perpetuate a system where religious minorities or women are subjected to the sort of 
bigotry and hostility that has been too characteristic of global history. But they like-
wise do not feel that they should have to drop their distinctive religious or sexual 
identities to be accepted as equal.67 What they want is the ability to be distinctively 
female or gay or Jewish or Buddhist (or what have you) as a normal, unremarkable 
part of daily life.68 Equality as normality envisions a time—perhaps a quite distant 
time—when a given identity, historically the site of significant oppression and mar-
ginalization, is able to enter into public life openly, fearlessly, and on equal terms as 
all others. 
C. The Undercurrent: Race and Fear 
Clearly, these two models of post-racialism are in tension with one another.69 But 
they also share a motivating commonality. Post-racialism is best understood as a de-
sire to transcend a racially stained past. This is what motivates so many people to 
demand such a radical shift in the role race plays on the American political terrain. 
Most White Americans retain some degree of shame for our collective racial past yet 
do not wish to be haunted by it forever.70 Post-racialism offers a vision of a new 
beginning for America, one freed of this toxic legacy. And viewed within this con-
text, those who persist in utilizing race as a category are seen as barriers—holding 
America back from reaching this new and more “enlightened” stage of our national 
                                                                                                                 
 
(1995). The classic retort to this came in MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 
(1999), but Warner’s argument was, of course, not that gayness should disappear but that it 
should maintain its unique, differentiated character vis-à-vis heterosexuality. A true parallel 
to first-model post-racialism would be difficult to find in a gay-rights context (as it borders 
precariously on conservative claims that homosexuality is a false and abhorrent identity), but 
perhaps the closest analogue would be in calls by some activists to abolish sexual orientation 
entirely in favor of a sexual outlook that is entirely fluid and not bound by rigid categorization. 
See Jamie Heckert, Resisting Orientation: On the Complexities of Desire and the Limits of Identity 
Politics (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh) (on file with the Indiana 
Law Journal). 
 67. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 56, at 8 (“Women do not want to change their sex, or 
black people the colour of their skin, as a condition for equal citizenship; nor do they want 
their differences discounted in an assimilationist imposition of ‘sameness’.”). 
 68. As Catharine MacKinnon notes, one cannot truly know what it is to be a woman while 
still laboring against omnipresent sexual domination. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED 45 (1987) (“Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongues 
women speak.”). 
 69. Though, notably, the second model may be a way station to the first. In a world where 
individuals and communities can elect to use race free of concerns that it is an inevitable har-
binger of doom, it is still entirely plausible they will simply elect not to. They might decide 
race is not an important or meaningful concept in their lives and let it lapse. That sort of world 
would look substantively identical to the sort of world envisioned in the first model of post-
racialism. 
 70. Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 976 (“Many Americans are tired of having to deal with 
race and embracing post-racialism frees at least white Americans from this ‘burden.’”). 
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development.71 By contrast, post-racialism promises moral absolution for our rac-
ially corrupt past. If race is America’s original sin, post-racialism offers out a virgin 
rebirth.72 
This sentiment is hardly new. As Darren Lenard Hutchinson compellingly docu-
ments, a collective sense of “exhaustion” towards dealing with race and racial topics 
has been a pervasive theme across our history, emerging at least as early as 
Reconstruction and reappearing in virtually every major social controversy related 
to race since.73 Its ubiquity creates legitimate grounds for skepticism with regards to 
its descriptive accuracy—to the extent that post-racial themes could be deployed as 
early as the 1866 debate over the Freedman’s Bureau, it is evident that the claim of 
post-racialism need bear no relationship to its reality.74 It is highly likely that many 
invocations of America as having successfully become “post-racial” are the racism 
equivalent of George Aiken’s (apocryphal) suggestion for extracting America from 
the Vietnam War75: declare victory and go home. But the prevalence and staying 
power of post-racial language does reveal its strong hold on America as an aspiration. 
Yet descriptive jumping-the-gun notwithstanding, the desire to attain such a world 
is not illegitimate.76 Skin color is essentially morally arbitrary, yet when imbued with 
an ideology of superiority and inferiority it can become extraordinarily dangerous.77 
Having experienced this moral catastrophe, we are right to be fearful of it. Stripping 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. (observing that, from the post-racialist mindset, those who oppose affirmative ac-
tion and other like policies are “the ones who have moved on to a new, more enlightened era, 
while those who are trying to continue race-conscious remedies are mired in the past”). 
 72. Douglas Kmiec characterizes the controversy in precisely these terms: a world where 
race is not publicly considered is a “society without sin.” Douglas W. Kmiec, Foreword, The 
Abolition of Public Racial Preference—An Invitation to Private Racial Sensitivity, 11 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (1997). 
 73. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917 (2009). 
 74. See id. at 931–38 (documenting congressional and executive opposition to the Bureau, 
which was framed as a special privilege for Black citizens that was unfair and unnecessary in 
the supposedly equal playing field established postemancipation); see also The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be 
some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases 
to be the special favorite of the laws . . . .”). 
 75. This instinct, of course, is what Crenshaw referred to in deriding those who think we 
can transcend racism “by proclamation alone.” Crenshaw, supra note 11, at 1347. 
 76. The problem is that, while people do suffer from a sense of cognitive dissonance when 
faced with injustice, they adopt the path of least resistance in resolving it. In situations where 
actually remedying the injustice itself is difficult or complicated, persons tend to simply re-
define the underlying dynamic in ways that are consistent with their belief in a “just world.” 
See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in 
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2006) (citing Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn 
H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966)). 
 77. See Greta McMorris, Comment, Critical Race Theory, Cognitive Psychology, and the 
Social Meaning of Race: Why Individualism Will Not Solve Racism, 67 UMKC L. REV. 695, 
705 (1999) (noting that “[s]kin color is about as arbitrary as eye color,” and children informed 
that their eye color makes them superior or inferior will begin to exhibit predictable behavioral 
reactions). 
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that sense of danger from race—returning it to a state of moral negligibility—offers 
a prospect of relief from centuries of severe social conflict. And that would un-
doubtedly be a good thing. Post-racialism—in either the first or second conception 
—holds appeal precisely because it offers a way out of a world where one of 
America’s most long-standing points of social cleavage has been healed. It is valid 
and necessary to resist those who wish to attain such victory by “proclamation 
alone,”78 but the aspiration itself is a perfectly reasonable one. 
II. POST-RACIALISM VERSUS STRICT SCRUTINY 
Contrary to what is commonly assumed, the application of strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications is in deep tension with the idea of post-racialism. Whereas post-
racialism seeks to minimize race’s salience, strict scrutiny is by its terms an extraor-
dinary usage of race, one that separates it out from virtually every other classification 
(including those we wish for race to emulate).79 The problem is both conceptual as 
well as specific to the particular doctrinal rules which have emerged sharply limiting 
the contexts in which race can legitimately be used. Doctrinally speaking, there is a 
deep contradiction between the Supreme Court’s limited carve-outs for when race 
can be used and the characteristics of post-racialism. And more broadly, it is self-
defeating to aspire to get beyond race while simultaneously meeting any public ap-
pearance of race with the full fury of American constitutional law. 
A. Post-Racialism Against Contemporary Equal Protection Doctrine: 
Putting Race on the Clock 
Constitutionally speaking, race is most associated with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.80 The Supreme Court has divided its 
equal-protection analysis, with most classifications receiving a minimal rational 
basis review81 and a few “suspect classifications” being subject instead to either 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. Crenshaw, supra note 11, at 1347. 
 79. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (describing 
strict scrutiny as providing “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); 
David Schraub, Comment, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection 
in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437, 1461 (2010) (“Additional judicial pro-
tection is extraordinary; rational basis review is ordinary.”). The tension whereby a putatively 
race-minimizing standard like strict scrutiny cannibalizes its own antidiscrimination children 
can also be seen in Richard Primus’s provocative argument that Title VII’s disparate-impact 
provisions may violate contemporary equal protection doctrine as an impermissible racial 
classification. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003). 
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 81. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“[A] statutory classification 
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must 
be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”). 
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intermediate82 or strict scrutiny.83 Rational basis is the baseline,84 and the Court has 
been quite vague in articulating how a classification becomes “suspect.”85 
Nonetheless, racial classifications are the paradigmatic—indeed, the original 
—example of the sort against which the Court applies strict scrutiny.86 
1. Accessing Strict Scrutiny 
The jurisprudential basis for providing heightened review to certain vulnerable 
classes has its genesis in the famous “footnote four” of Carolene Products.87 That 
case indicated that “discrete and insular minorities” may be particularly susceptible 
to majoritarian discrimination and, by the same token, be particularly unable to resort 
to the democratic process for redress.88 But since by definition minorities will 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that sex classifications are subject 
to an intermediate level of scrutiny). This will be discussed further in Part III.A.2, infra. 
 83. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that 
strict scrutiny is applied “when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin”). 
 84. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (“Unless a 
classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect dis-
tinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the 
statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.”); Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in 
Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 811 
(2011) (“[W]hat makes the scrutiny ‘strict’ is the fact that it negates the normal presumption 
that legislation will be treated as constitutionally valid unless the law fails basic rationality 
requirements.” (emphasis in original)). 
 85. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (considering whether the group 
members possess “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a 
discrete group”); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (asking 
whether the group members have been “subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereo-
typed characteristics not truly indicative of their abilit[y]” to contribute meaningfully to soci-
ety); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (listing the “traditional 
indicia of suspectness” as including whether the group was “saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process”); see also Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 367–72 
 86. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”). Notably, “strict scrutiny” is no longer limited 
to racial classifications or, for that matter, equal-protection inquiries, having been exported to 
a wide variety of other constitutional inquiries (such as alleged impingements against “funda-
mental rights”). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1267 (2007). Needless to say, post-racialism does not imply the end of strict scrutiny in 
those arenas. 
 87. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 88. Id. Scholars have disagreed on the validity of this principle. Compare JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW passim (1980) (drawing on 
Carolene Products to create a comprehensive “representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial 
review), with Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–24 
(1985) (declaring Carolene Products “utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis” and arguing that 
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normally be losers in a democratic system,89 something more must be required to 
render a classification dangerous enough to enjoy enhanced judicial scrutiny. Though 
the Court has not been exactly uniform in articulating its factors,90 San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez is probably the most thorough listing of the 
“indicia of suspectness” that render a classification liable to face strict or heightened 
scrutiny.91 These include whether the group was “saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.”92 While the middle factor—“a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment”—remains active in perpetuity, the surrounding two diminish in 
salience as legally imposed disabilities disappear, and the political integration of ra-
cial minorities continues apace.93 
In theory, then, strict scrutiny seems like it should be temporally limited—once 
the characteristics which caused the group to be seen as needing special fortification 
no longer hold, the protection would be lifted.94 In practice, no case has even con-
templated (much less seriously threatened) the removal of a classification which pre-
viously received strict scrutiny from the ranks of “suspect classifications.”95 Far from 
being a temporary shield responsive to particular social facts, strict scrutiny appears 
to be seen as a permanent designation.96 
Rodriguez should be the bulwark against this—for Rodriguez lays out a series of 
factors which would seem to provide the criteria for whether strict scrutiny should 
be maintained or abandoned. The problem, of course, is that Rodriguez has never 
been applied consistently even in how heightened scrutiny is extended and has been 
ignored entirely with respect to the question of lifting suspect status.97 Judges have 
exploited the indeterminacy latent in its three prongs to support wildly divergent re-
sults with respect to how a class receives heightened scrutiny.98 So it is that the Court 
declines to label gays and lesbians a suspect class because they are not “politically 
                                                                                                                 
 
“discrete and insular minorities” should be expected to fare better than average in a democratic 
system). 
 89. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]n 
a majoritarian system, numerical minorities lose elections.”); Ackerman, supra note 88, at 719 
(declaring that a central part of any democratic system is that minorities lose elections).  
 90. See supra note 85. 
 91. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 383 (identifying the suspect-status criteria as 
“transient in theory but concrete in fact”). 
 94. Id. at 367; see also Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the 
Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 226 (2004) (“[O]nce a group is protected, 
it remains a protected class until the courts are willing to say that criteria for protection no 
longer exists [sic].”). 
 95. Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 363. 
 96. Id. at 363 (describing suspect status as a “one-way ratchet”). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology 
When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 739 
(2008) (observing, with respect to the differential treatment of sexual orientation, disability, 
and racial majorities, that “the cases increasingly tend to be all over the map”). 
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powerless”99 while at the same time extending strict scrutiny to racial majorities 
(who—whatever other characteristics they might share—are most certainly not gen-
erally excluded from participation in the political process).100 The growing disso-
nance between the judiciary’s general unwillingness to accord heightened scrutiny 
to anti-gay classifications and its continued application in racial contexts is reflective 
less of a cohesive legal principle than simple paralysis.101 Rodriguez, in other words, 
can block new groups from gaining access to strict scrutiny, but it has proven utterly 
inadequate as a guidepost for when such “extraordinary protection” should be 
removed. 
Of course, for any given classification, one can justify the maintenance of strict 
scrutiny on the grounds that we have not yet progressed enough away from the con-
ditions that necessitated judicial protection in the first place.102 With respect to race 
(one would argue), despite the advances of the past fifty years, it may be that racial 
minorities are still sufficiently disabled, still sufficiently isolated from the political 
mainstream, so as to deserve “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”103 And indeed, this probably would be the defense of most strict-scrutiny 
advocates—that while a post-racial society is the goal, we have not yet achieved it. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 613 (Md. 2007) (rejecting heightened scrutiny with 
respect to a challenge against the ban on gay marriage); accord Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t 
of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 & n.16 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing primarily pre-
Lawrence cases in refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to Florida’s law prohibiting gays from 
adopting); Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 975 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (plurality opin-
ion) (same). Compare David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 187, 190–96 (noting the “peril” of high-profile advances by gay-
rights activists when trying to persuade courts to grant them heightened scrutiny), and 
Schraub, supra note 79, at 1456–60 (detailing how allegedly excessive gay political power has 
been used to stymie their efforts to gain heightened scrutiny), with Kenji Yoshino, Suspect 
Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 
1806 (1996) (“Blacks are protected by three federal constitutional amendments, major federal 
Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, 1875, . . . 1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, and 1968, as well 
as by antidiscrimination laws in 48 of the states.” (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. 
Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc))). 
 100. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 101. See, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, 
AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 24 (1999) (“The list of protected 
classes has been in stasis since [the mid-1970s].”); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without 
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485 (2004) (noting that the Court has not added a classification 
to the list of suspect classifications since the 1970s—closing the “set” almost immediately 
after first laying down the doctrinal criteria for suspect status in Rodriguez). The partial ex-
ception, of course, is adding racial majorities to the list in the late 1980s and early 1990s—but 
the Court conceptualized that as falling within its previous denotation of racial classifications 
as suspect. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 102. Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 384 (articulating the “lack of opportunity” 
justification for maintaining strict scrutiny). 
 103. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Of course, phras-
ing the inquiry this way illustrates the strangeness of extending strict scrutiny to racial majori-
ties, which never did and do not now experience these maladies. 
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But that does not eliminate the tension with post-racialism so much as it illuminates 
it. Strict scrutiny makes sense only so far as we do believe that race plays a significant 
role in the distribution of American opportunity.  
There is, in short, a fundamental hypocrisy in how proponents of post-racialism 
treat strict scrutiny. Consider how Abigail Thernstrom has characterized the Voting 
Rights Act: it should be viewed as “a curfew imposed in the wake of a riot—an 
emergency measure taken with the expectation that it would be lifted as soon as con-
ditions allowed.”104 If this is right, surely it is equally right with respect to an “ex-
traordinary” constitutional doctrine like strict scrutiny. There too, race-based legal 
doctrines should have an exit strategy. Once the conditions surrounding race in 
America no longer are such so as to command “extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process”—in other words, when we actually are post-racial in 
the sense its proponents claim we already are105—to continue to preserve strict scru-
tiny review would completely detach the doctrine from its jurisprudential moorings: 
a supposedly exceptional safeguard necessary only in the context of extraordinary, 
democracy-defeating prejudice and discrimination. 
2. Applying Strict Scrutiny 
Once it is found that a classification is subject to strict scrutiny, the black-letter 
test requires that the challenged statute be comprised of “narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.”106 Though strict scrutiny is often 
described as “fatal in fact,”107 it is reasonably well established that the doctrine per-
mits the use of race in a few narrow circumstances.108 One rather controversial and 
precarious carve-out for the use of race is for promoting diversity in educational 
settings.109 But even the staunchest critics of governmental racial classifications 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 46 (1987). 
 105. Giradeau Spann identifies the following three post-racial assumptions:  
First, current racial minorities are no longer the victims of significant discrimi-
nation. Second, as a result, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities at 
the expense of whites constitute a form of reverse discrimination against whites 
that must be prevented in the name of racial equality. Third, because the post-
racial playing field is now level, any disadvantages that racial minorities continue 
to suffer must be caused by their own shortcomings rather than by the lingering 
effects of now-dissipated past discrimination. 
Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1135 (2010). 
 106. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 107. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
8 (1972). 
 108. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (arguing against “the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518–19 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment))); see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in 
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
834 (2006) (finding that between 1990 and 2003, federal courts upheld racial classifications 
analyzed under strict scrutiny in twenty-seven percent of all cases). 
 109. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (“[A] university may 
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agree it can be used to directly rectify prior governmental discrimination.110 In 
general, the less willing a Justice is to believe that we have achieved our post-racial 
ambitions, the more willing he or she is to countenance the use of race to intervene 
against the remaining inequities.111 
Strict scrutiny is thus often characterized as a way of diminishing the use of race 
in the public sphere, in that race is a forbidden ground for government action absent 
a few exceptionally compelling circumstances. When government elects to use 
race—even in seemingly innocuous and evenhanded ways—it can act to elevate 
race’s significance even beyond whatever baseline exists in normal politics.112 So in 
Anderson v. Martin, the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute which 
printed the race of public office candidates on the ballot.113 On its face, this law seems 
to be the epitome of a “benign” use of race: treating all races identically and subject-
ing none to any official impairment or restriction of any kind.114 Of course, it is al-
most certain that the Louisiana legislature had decidedly impure motives in passing 
this law, and the Court was not blind to this reality.115 But even if Louisiana had 
                                                                                                                 
 
institute a race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining ‘the educational bene-
fits that flow from student body diversity.’” (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. 
Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013))); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (affirming the legiti-
macy of the diversity rationale); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–15 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (holding that promoting racial diversity constituted a compelling 
governmental interest so long as it was not the only factor considered by a public university’s 
admissions program). 
 110. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 751 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based 
decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial 
purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances. First, in schools that were formerly segre-
gated by law, race-based measures are sometimes constitutionally compelled to remedy prior 
school segregation. Second, in Croson, the Court appeared willing to authorize a government 
unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible.” (citing Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989))). 
 111. Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202–03 (2010). 
 112. The Court has, with some embarrassment, conceded that race is at least descriptively 
relevant to the voting decisions of many Americans  and that voters have the right to make 
such judgments. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (affirming “the right of a citi-
zen to cast his vote for whomever he chooses and for whatever reason he pleases”); see also 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Of course race, like 
religion, plays an important role in the choices which individual voters make from among 
various candidates.”); John Hart Ely, Commentary, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority 
Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576, 590 (1997) (“[I]t is the right of a citizen to choose 
among constitutionally qualified candidates on any basis she wants—good looks, height, reli-
gion, gender, race, a resemblance to Uncle Lester—and although some of them are lamentable, 
all are constitutionally sheltered bases for choosing which lever to pull.” (footnote omitted)). 
 113. 375 U.S. at 403–04. 
 114. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 788–89; cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1967) 
(analyzing the claim that Virginia’s bar on interracial marriage does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because the restriction falls upon both races equally). 
 115. Anderson, 375 U.S. at 404 (“Obviously, Louisiana may not bar Negro citizens from 
offering themselves as candidates for public office, nor can it encourage its citizens to vote for 
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completely innocent intentions, the Court observed that the effect of this specific use 
of race was particularly likely to enhance the salience of race even beyond that al-
ready expected to exist in electoral politics. “[B]y placing a racial label on a candi-
date at the most crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is 
cast—the State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to 
operate against one group because of race and for another.”116  
But the claim that strict scrutiny in every case acts to minimize the salience of 
race in American institutions is hardly a self-evident proposition. Note that the argu-
ment in Anderson is specific to the particular statute before the Court, and what 
Anderson did that many subsequent cases did not was actually make a defined argu-
ment for why—given the motives and effects of the statute—the particular govern-
ment usage of race was likely to increase race’s relevance in a morally precarious 
manner.117 It does not follow that in every instance where a governmental body uti-
lizes racial classifications, it will make race more salient. Indeed, in other situations, 
the courts have permitted—and federal antidiscrimination law sometimes requires 
—the collection and publication of racial data, without running through traditional 
strict-scrutiny analysis.118 
While sometimes legal suppression of race does act to reduce its impact on public 
affairs, strict scrutiny often elevates rather than diminishes the salience of race. David 
Strauss gives the example of a legislature that, upon finding that race genuinely had 
a significant statistical correlation with driving behavior, used race as a proxy for the 
minimum age one could receive a driver’s license.119 Assuming the legislature genu-
inely wanted nothing more than to use the most efficient, lowest-cost proxy for driv-
ers’ safety (and race turned out to be that proxy), the decision to overturn that statute 
(as modern strict scrutiny doctrine inevitably would) is in an important sense more 
race conscious than the legislature’s enactment itself. “The legislature’s decision is 
                                                                                                                 
 
a candidate solely on account of race. And that which cannot be done by express statutory 
prohibition cannot be done by indirection.” (citation omitted)). 
 116. Id. at 402. 
 117. Cf. Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten, 
86 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 340–41 (1998) (arguing that Anderson gestured in the direction of 
articulating a theory for why and in what circumstances non-proxy racial discrimination is 
impermissible but that this thread was dropped in future cases which began to identify all such 
classifications as inherently unconstitutional); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assign-
ment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 
805–08 (2006) (positing a continuum of judicial treatment of race, based on the Justices’ as-
sessment of the risk that the use of race will increase or diminish racial balkanization). 
 118. See, e.g., Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 611–12 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding 
the collection of racial data in the course of an investigation by the Office of Civil Rights in 
New York); United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277, 279 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding 
the Civil Rights Act’s requirement that racial data be collected for purpose of civil rights en-
forcement); Hamm v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va. 1964) (up-
holding a Virginia statute requiring that the race of the parties be designated on divorce de-
crees), aff’d sub nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964); see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva 
B. Siegel, Essay, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 937–39 
(2006) (detailing the shift in attitudes regarding the permissibility of government collecting 
racial data). 
 119. Strauss, supra note 22, at 108–11. 
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colorblind in the sense that it treats race exactly like any other characteristic. The 
court’s decision is race-conscious because it singles out race as a special character-
istic and forces people to become conscious of race in a way they would not other-
wise be.”120 
Despite this complexity, it is undeniable that the Court’s framing of when the use 
of race is permissible is suffused with a desire to minimize race’s salience—an effort 
to make America post-racial. Take the well-accepted ability to use race as a remedy 
for past racial discrimination.121 Given America’s sustained history of racist discrim-
ination, this opening could loom quite large. Cognizant of this possibility, the 
Supreme Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education was explicit in precluding 
the use of racial classifications solely to remedy “societal discrimination.”122 The 
problem with relying on “societal discrimination” as a hook for race-conscious re-
mediation is that it could theoretically allow for the endless use of race—“remedies 
that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the 
future.”123 This, of course, would run precisely counter to post-racial ambitions, 
which anticipate an America where race has faded from prominence.124 
Wygant’s mantra has echoed constantly in subsequent cases.125 The Court has 
consistently cast its jurisprudence against a world where “race will always be rele-
vant in American life.”126 Where the Court does allow race to be considered, it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Id. at 111. 
 121. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 752–53 
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging that, where the state has maintained a policy 
of de jure discrimination, “race-based remedial measures are sometimes required”). 
 122. 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“This Court never has held that societal 
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted 
upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing 
limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.”); see also Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 754 (Thomas, J. concurring) (citing Wygant to observe that “[a]side from 
constitutionally compelled remediation in schools, this Court has permitted government units 
to remedy prior racial discrimination only in narrow circumstances”). 
 123. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (concluding that “[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is 
too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy”); see also Parents Involved, 
551 U.S. at 731 (plurality opinion) (“[I]n Seattle the [race-conscious school integration] plans 
are defended as necessary to address the consequences of racially identifiable housing patterns. 
The sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is contrary to our rulings that remedying past 
societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.”). 
 124. See also Ward, supra note 46, at 603–04 (worrying about making racial or ethnic 
divisions into a “permanent” part of our governmental and political system). 
 125. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730–31 (plurality opinion) (attacking Seattle 
and Louisville’s “racial balancing” plans as sanctioning the indefinite and possibly perpetual 
use of race); Metro Broad. Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 614 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(worrying that “proportional representation of various races” would “support indefinite use of 
racial classifications . . .”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) 
(concerned about usages of race that have “no logical stopping point” (quoting Wygant, 476 
U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion))). 
 126. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (plurality opinion) (worrying that allowing “benign” racial 
classifications will mean that “race will always be relevant in American life, and that the 
‘ultimate goal’ of ‘eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant 
624 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:599 
 
demands strict temporal limits. So, in Grutter v. Bollinger,127 the Supreme Court en-
dorsed diversity as a compelling state interest sufficient to sanction racial affirmative 
action but declared its expectation that “25 years from now, the use of racial prefer-
ences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”128 Having 
given a narrow carve-out for the use of race, the Court proceeded to place it on the 
clock.129 Like in Wygant, the goal was to forestall a situation where racially inflected 
decision making was a permanent feature of American governance. For the Court to 
admit that might be necessary130 would place it in fundamental conflict with the 
widely popular post-racial ambition.131 
Yet, the “shot clock” logic of Wygant and Grutter raises a serious problem for 
proponents of permanently elevating race to strict-scrutiny status. At the time strict-
scrutiny doctrine was first being developed and applied, there is no question it fit 
well within the contours of specific remediation of governmentally sponsored dis-
crimination. Korematsu132—the original strict-scrutiny case—came nearly twenty 
years before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,133 and America still permit-
ted de jure segregation of public facilities.134 As this sort of official governmental 
racism grows more distant, however, it becomes harder to hinge continued use of 
strict scrutiny on its supposedly remedial qualities. Instead, the continued enforce-
ment of strict scrutiny appears motivated more by general reference to the historical 
pedigree of race in America. Proposals to even retreat to intermediate scrutiny in 
evaluating certain racial classifications are said to “turn[] back the clock” to a darker 
period in America’s racial jurisprudence135 without recognizing the incongruity: 
simultaneously asserting that racism is so pervasive as to be permanently akin to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
factors as a human being’s race’ will never be achieved” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
 127. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 128. Id. at 343. 
 129. Id. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. . . . [A]ll 
governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”). 
 130. At the very least, there are some indications that twenty-five years may have been an 
unduly optimistic assessment. Alan Krueger, Jesse Rothstein & Sarah Turner, Race, Income, 
and College in 25 Years: Evaluating Justice O’Connor’s Conjecture, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
282 (2006) (predicting that, even assuming bias is no longer a factor, the legacy of past racial 
discrimination will continue to elicit noticeable racially disparate effects in twenty-five years). 
 131. See Vijay S. Sekhon, Maintaining the Legitimacy of the High Court: Understanding 
the “25 Years” in Grutter v. Bollinger, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 301, 308–10 (2004) (arguing 
that the twenty-five-year limit was an effort by the Court to preserve its legitimacy with the 
American public). 
 132. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 133. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 134. The first crack in segregationist armor had emerged, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349–50 (1938) (striking down Missouri’s policy of paying for the out-
of-state education of Black students in lieu of integrating the state’s law school), but Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and with it, the broader principle of “separate but equal,” 
remained good law. 
 135. Metro Broad. Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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situation which prevailed in pre-Civil Rights America and yet so sporadic as to 
foreclose race-conscious remedies in all but the narrowest range of cases.136 
B. Putting Race Before Our Eyes 
The previous section identified two doctrinal points of tension between the ideal 
of post-racialism and the way in which race is elevated via strict scrutiny. First, the 
basic premises by which race is accorded suspect status—its supposed particular vul-
nerability to majoritarian oppression and democratic failure—are by necessity less 
and less credible the more stridently we proclaim ourselves “post-racial.” Second, 
while the use of race is supposed to be authorized only as a temporary remedy for 
discrete and ongoing racial ailments, the continued application of strict scrutiny 
seems to stem less from such particularized wrongs and more from a generalized 
invocation of our racist past. 
One cogent critique of the above is that it is simply too-cute formalism. Sure, 
technically the Court has not harmonized its strict-scrutiny doctrine with its general 
strictures on the use of race. But all this means is that the Court has sub rosa carved 
out an exemption for the application of its scrutiny doctrine.137 I do not believe this 
objection is entirely on target: it does not seem to give due credence either to the 
Court’s very specific limitations on what makes a particular classification subject to 
strict scrutiny,138 nor does it answer Wygant’s fears of a race-based doctrine extend-
ing endlessly into the future.139 Nonetheless, in this subpart, I will extend beyond 
doctrinal analysis to argue why strict scrutiny and post-racialism exist in inherent 
tension. 
As noted previously, one concept of post-racialism is predicated upon making 
race “disappear,”140 and strict scrutiny is a very blunt and direct governmental effort 
to suppress race. The presumption is that the usage of race in governmental decision 
making causes us to let slip decades of hard-won progress towards diminishing the 
relevance of race, and so “race becomes important once more.”141 But by creating an 
effective taboo around the usage or discussion of race, strict scrutiny effectively ele-
vates, rather than suppresses, the public salience of race. As Michel Foucault argued 
with respect to sexuality, the proscription around speaking of sex led to an 
“explosion” of discourses surrounding it.142 To insistently not speak of something is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 413 (describing the problem of “partial 
racial politics”). 
 137. In Grutter, the Court declared that “racial classifications, however compelling their 
goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the inter-
est demands.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003). It may be, for example, that the 
Court believes that permanent maintenance of race-based strict scrutiny is the narrowest pos-
sible mechanism for ensuring that race is otherwise excised from American society. 
 138. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 139. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 140. See supra Part I.A. 
 141. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 778 n.10. 
 142. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 17–18 (Robert Hurley trans., 
Vintage Books 1990) (1978); see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-
626 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:599 
 
indistinguishable from speaking about it constantly.143 And so it is with race: that we 
have a systemic and unyielding structure of rules and regulations geared at prohibit-
ing the usage of race in any form or context necessarily heightens the salience of race 
in the mind of the public.144 Consequently, “racelessness implies not the end of racial 
consciousness but its ultimate elevation to the given.”145 The power of race is at its 
apex when it need not be spoken of to be omnipresent. 
As Catharine MacKinnon observes, there are a whole host of potential identity 
characteristics upon which we might think systematically differential outcomes 
would be unjust, but our antidiscrimination law covers only a scarce, special few.146 
The entire structure of antidiscrimination law is premised on the exceptional quality 
of the identity axes it targets—it represents “an exception to the legal system’s basic 
unwillingness to intervene in those processes of social selection.”147 Precisely be-
cause this treatment is so extraordinary, it is extremely unlikely that a doctrine which 
seeks to bury race could ever succeed in expunging race from our collective con-
sciousness; if anything, it enhances its presence. 
Research into the psychology of prejudice is beginning to bear this intuition out. 
“Suppressing” race in the manner encouraged by strict scrutiny is facially consistent 
with the broadly accepted contemporary consensus on race, namely, that racism is 
wrong and that we should strive to treat all persons fairly regardless of their racial 
heritage. Again, this is a phenomenon of long-standing import—Gunnar Myrdal’s 
description of the “American dilemma” was precisely one of attempting to sublimate 
racist attitudes as inconsistent with a broader American ethos of liberal equality.148 
                                                                                                                 
 
Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1991) (“A subject is defined by its negation, hence, an asser-
tion of nonconsideration necessarily implies consideration. The stronger and more defined the 
character of racial recognition, the clearer and more sharply drawn its dialectical opposite, 
racial nonrecognition.” (italics in original)). 
 143. Cf. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL!: FIVE ESSAYS ON 
SEPTEMBER 11 AND RELATED DATES 56 (2002) (“Evil resides (also) in the innocent gaze itself 
which perceives Evil all around.”). 
 144. Strauss, supra note 22, at 112 (“The fact is that the prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation makes people intensely race-conscious. That is because when race is involved, people 
must refrain from acting in the way they would act toward any comparable characteristic.”). 
Richard Epstein is one of the few willing to take this insight for all it’s worth—advocating the 
repeal of Title VII on the grounds that the free market should drive out invidious racial dis-
crimination and affirming that any residual disparities would be the result of efficient ordering 
by rational economic actors. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 46 (1992). 
 145. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE 236 (2002). 
 146. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 106 (1979) 
(observing that there is a “vast range of arguably unjust but shared bases for human differen-
tiation which Congress and the courts do not see as their function to police”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA lxxix (Transaction 1996) (1944) (“The 
‘American Dilemma’ . . . is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations 
preserved on the general plane which we call the ‘American Creed,’ where the American 
thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the 
other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal 
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Insofar as conscious suppression of racial biases is both externally valid (in that, 
ideologically speaking, to say that one did not intentionally utilize racial considera-
tions is sufficient to satisfy one’s public obligations with respect to race) and inter-
nally valid (in that consciously avoiding race allows one to convince oneself that 
one’s behavior is consistent with one’s egalitarian moral principles with respect to 
race) as a way of “handling” race, this strategy represents a highly attractive mecha-
nism for resolving Myrdal’s dilemma.149 
But the effort to simply fiat away racist attitudes via conscious declaration does 
little to affect racial attitudes or presuppositions that lie beyond conscious control. 
Instead, it merely encourages people to suppress elements of their psyche which 
clash with an idealized self-image of themselves as nonracist.150 The act of suppres-
sion, in other words, creates a conflict between conscious political commitments 
(here, that race is irrelevant) and subconscious attitudes (where race remains quite 
relevant)—and that conflict itself creates a tension that may manifest in renewed 
racial hostility.151 Social psychologists have documented a “rebound effect” where 
                                                                                                                 
 
and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; consideration of community pres-
tige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts 
of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.”) 
 149. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (“[A person] can believe quite sincerely that she is making 
a ‘neutral’ decision ‘on the merits.’ And . . . the [person’s] belief that she acted on the merits 
will be reinforced by the desire to believe that she treats minorities in an equitable fashion.” 
(footnote omitted)); Hanson & Hanson, supra note 76, at 419 (“[P]eople crave justice . . . . 
[H]owever, . . . we often satisfy the craving through troubling means: when alleviating inno-
cent suffering is at all difficult or complex, people reconceive the victim as deserving the suf-
fering by assigning negative characteristics to her.”). See generally E. Ashby Plant & Patricia 
G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation To Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1998) (distinguishing between social versus intrinsic mo-
tivations encouraging people to refrain from exhibiting prejudiced responses). 
 150. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315 (2000) (“The aversive-racism framework further 
suggests that contemporary racial bias is expressed in indirect ways that do not threaten the 
aversive racist’s nonprejudiced self-image. Because aversive racists consciously recognize 
and endorse egalitarian values, they will not discriminate in situations in which they recognize 
that discrimination would be obvious to others and themselves—for example, when the ap-
propriate response is clearly dictated. However, because aversive racists do possess negative 
feelings, often unconsciously, discrimination occurs when bias is not obvious or can be ration-
alized on the basis of some factor other than race.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–23 
(1987) (“[T]he human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refus-
ing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has 
learned is good or right.”); see also Alan Helmreich & Paul Marcus, Introduction: Black-
Jewish Conflict, in BLACKS AND JEWS ON THE COUCH: PSYCHOANALYTIC REFLECTIONS ON 
BLACK-JEWISH CONFLICT 1, 6 (Alan Helmreich & Paul Marcus eds., 1998) (arguing that in 
order “to reduce racist and bigoted attitudes and behavior, it is precisely those unacceptable 
feelings, attitudes, and attributes that students are ashamed of and have disavowed, repressed, 
and projected that need to be ‘worked through’” (quoting Mark Bracher, Editor’s Introduction, 
1 J. FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS CULTURE & SOC. 1, 10 (1996))). 
 151. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, 
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persons attempting to police their behavior so as to minimize prejudicial responses 
“chok[e] under pressure” and instead demonstrate colder behavior towards 
outgroups.152 While suppression can be effective for short time periods, “the ironic 
outcome [is] that the stereotype becomes hyperaccessible when the suppression in-
struction is relaxed or when cognitive resources are drained.”153 Persons are simply 
unable to maintain a state of constant, uninterrupted vigilance regarding their use of 
race. Eventually, the levies break and racial thinking comes flooding back—to the 
shame of the thinker, who begins to associate interracial interaction with anxiety and 
apprehension. A social model which simultaneously reinforces race’s pervasiveness 
while condemning those who notice race is a social model guaranteed to fail—par-
ticularly if the goal is to become “post-racial.” 
One does not have to delve into our psychological depths to understand the ten-
sion with post-racialism, however. The demand for strict review of racial classifica-
tions reflects the belief that “[t]he state may neither use race in its own business nor 
may it encourage others to take it into account.”154 But by barring racial discrimina-
tion and classifications, we’ve already expressed that race is something especially 
worthy of our concern and attention. As David Strauss puts it, “race is already before 
our eyes.”155 “The prohibition against [racial] discrimination forces us to recognize 
that race is different from other bases for classifying people and forces us to act dif-
ferently toward race from the way we act toward other characteristics.”156 
Unlike most other identity axes, we have singled out race as something uniquely 
and systematically dangerous. Having made that determination, however, it is un-
clear how Wygant’s admonition against using the generic history of “societal dis-
crimination” to justify race-conscious remedies garners any sort of normative 
punch.157 In effect, we are making the declaration that—far from being post-racial 
—race and racism are so pervasive in our society that it demands a separate, 
                                                                                                                 
 
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 64 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) 
(finding that the tension between conscious commitments and unconscious attitudes creates 
“anxiety or uneasiness” surrounding interracial interactions, which is then transmuted onto the 
minority group in the form of renewed prejudice). A similar effect might occur in the realm of 
sexual orientation, where researchers have found a class of persons with suppressed ho-
mosexual attractions that demonstrate heightened public hostility to gays and lesbians. Netta 
Weinstein, William S. Ryan, Cody R. DeHaan, Andrew K. Przybylski, Nicole Legate & 
Richard M. Ryan, Parental Autonomy Support and Discrepancies Between Implicit and 
Explicit Sexual Identities: Dynamics of Self-Acceptance and Defense, 102 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 815 (2012). 
 152. Jacquie D. Vorauer & Cory A. Turpie, Disruptive Effects of Vigilance on Dominant 
Group Members’ Treatment of Outgroup Members: Choking Versus Shining Under Pressure, 
87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 385, 395 (2004); accord, e.g., Margo J. Monteith, 
Jeffrey W. Sherman & Patricia G. Devine, Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 78 (1998). 
 153. Monteith et al., supra note 152, at 77. 
 154. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 790. 
 155. Strauss, supra note 22, at 131. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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freestanding legal structure dedicated to eradicating it and it alone.158 If “societal 
discrimination” of this sort is sufficient to admit one race-conscious legal doctrine 
(strict scrutiny), it isn’t clear why it can’t admit others. 
A post-racial society is not one which is forced to treat race as its ultimate “mon-
ster in the closet,” against which no quarter can be given and no compromise ex-
tended. That may be a practical response to race in a society suffused with racism or 
even a permanent policy for one pessimistic about the process of ever transcending 
a history of racism.159 But the one thing it isn’t is “post-racial,” or a strategy for 
getting us there.160 
III. STRICT SCRUTINY IN A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 
The prior Parts have sought to demonstrate a deep and intractable conflict between 
becoming “post-racial” and using strict scrutiny. Conceptually, race cannot be trans-
cended while remaining our “monster in the closet.” Doctrinally, the application of 
strict scrutiny to racial categorization violates several well-established precepts over 
when race can and cannot be used: it is timeless where we claim to desire finitude,161 
justified by a general social history of discrimination rather than any specific, identi-
fiable ailment,162 and provided by reference to a class with increasing political influ-
ence when it is supposed to be restricted only to those who are uniquely politically 
dispossessed.163 
Does this mean strict scrutiny is worthless? I do not believe so. Rather, what is 
needed is a more nuanced inquiry: in which contexts does strict scrutiny help advance 
rather than hold back the cause of racial justice? Moreover, the conflict identified 
above can do more—it can clarify and sharpen precisely what it is we mean by our 
“post-racial” aspiration. In this Part, I explore three different manners by which the 
above tension between post-racialism and strict scrutiny can be resolved. First, I ex-
amine how our contemporary racial jurisprudence would change if we abandoned 
strict scrutiny altogether—in effect, if we acted as if we truly were a post-racial so-
ciety already.164 Then I turn to the opposite extreme—defending strict scrutiny to the 
extent that we believe America will never be post-racial and where race always is so 
dangerous that it must be suppressed at all costs.165 Finally, I revisit the second model 
of post-racialism, taking religion and indigenous status as a model.166 In both cases, 
there have been long histories of severe social conflict that we are trying to transcend. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Cf. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, 85 
GEO. L.J. 667, 677 (1997) (arguing that “[r]acism is woven into the warp and the woof of 
society”). 
 159. See infra Part III.B. 
 160. Strauss, supra note 22, at 112–13 (“If we are trying to escape ‘racial thinking,’ if we 
are trying to achieve a society in which people really are as unaware of each others’ race as 
they are of eye color, the prohibition against discrimination is not the way to do it.”). 
 161. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 122–23, 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 87–99 and accompanying text. 
 164. See infra Part III.A. 
 165. See infra Part III.B. 
 166. See infra Part III.C. 
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But in both cases, the manner by which we are attempting to get “post” is not by 
suppressing the identity axis but rather by turning it into something no longer feared. 
A. The End of Strict Scrutiny 
As I have argued, strict scrutiny is precisely the sort of extraordinary usage of race 
that should be rendered superfluous in a truly post-racial society. To put the issue 
bluntly: if we are truly post-racial (at least under the first conception of post-racial), 
we should have no hesitation in jettisoning strict scrutiny, because we should expect 
the result to be—absolutely nothing. If post-racialism means race is, descriptively 
speaking, utterly irrelevant in modern life, a world without strict scrutiny should look 
precisely identical to one with it (except that it omits the now-anachronistic doctrinal 
superordination of race). A post-racial society would have no reason for any interest 
group to even contemplate proposing a racial classification. And if an idiosyncratic 
locality or institution did decide to create one, it would not raise any alarm bells. It 
might seem strange or peculiar, akin to a distinction based on eye color, or it might 
seem like a random but innocuous method of social organization, like a distinction 
based on the alphabetical order of names, but it would not signal anything 
dangerous.167  
Of course, very few of us are willing to put our money where our mouths are in 
this respect. That alone is powerful evidence that we don’t actually believe what 
claims exist of having already successfully become post-racial. And the arguments 
above have cast serious doubt as to whether strict scrutiny can complete a transition 
to a post-racial America. This section will explore what America’s race jurisprudence 
and legal structure might look like were we truly committed to the sort of “post-
racialism” that would render race akin to eye color, or other “irrelevant” 
characteristics. 
1. Race Like Anything Else—Peremptory Strikes and the Strange Career of 
Hereditary Preferences 
It is difficult to talk about how “race” might be used in a “post-racial” society. If 
race were irrelevant, why would anybody use it at all? Peremptory strikes are a good 
proxy for how race might be treated in a “post-racial” legal regime because they 
represent a scenario where law explicitly warrants decision making based on criteria 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. As Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Trina Jones recently observed, this was 
more or less the argument made by the Court in Plessy, which used rhetoric similar to modern 
“post-racial” themes in minimizing the social salience of race in America. Barnes et al., supra 
note 58, at 969 & n.10; see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (arguing that any 
imputation of Black inferiority stemming from railcar segregation exists “solely because the 
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it”); see also Ronald Turner, Plessy 2.0, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 861, 917 (2009) (arguing that Plessy and Parents Involved are united 
in their deliberate blindness to the continued public salience of race in America). In Plessy, of 
course, this appeal to the purportedly innocent character of racial segregation was willfully 
blind to the continued salience of race, which rendered these distinctions the furthest thing 
from innocuous. If society truly were post-racial, however, it would be a different matter 
entirely. 
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normally thought of as irrelevant. The whole reason one uses a peremptory strike to 
eliminate a juror is that one does not possess a “good” reason—that is, one sufficient 
to establish for-cause removal—to do so. And indeed, the debate over race-based 
peremptory strikes in juror selection is one area where a “second model” post-racial 
position has emerged,168 albeit primarily in dissent.  
In Batson v. Kentucky,169 the Supreme Court held for the first time that peremptory 
challenges of potential jurors could not be made on the grounds of race.170 Where a 
party is alleged to have made a race-based juror strike, she must proffer “a neutral 
explanation” for the challenge.171 This represents a rather drastic departure from the 
entire point of a peremptory challenge, which normally permits a juror to be struck 
“for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to [the prosecutor’s] view 
concerning the outcome.”172  
Here again,173 the majority places race in an extraordinary legal position. Most 
group affiliations—even when the group is defined by its utilization of a constitu-
tional right—do not enjoy Batson’s protection.174 Lawyers are not barred from strik-
ing jurors based on group characteristics,175 even “crudely stereotypical” assessments 
of group characteristics.176 In other words, race is not being carved out from the 
broader thrust of peremptory challenges because it represents an illogical reason for 
striking a juror. Peremptory challenges are not an area where the law even purports 
to normally require legal actors to have “good” reasons for their decisions. Race is 
carved out because we believe race is extraordinarily and especially dangerous, ne-
cessitating unique rules restricting its deployment even in an area where we are by 
design exceptionally lax in requiring legal actors to conform their behavior to normal 
standards of rationality or propriety.  
Critics of the Batson regime have observed that this extraordinary treatment of 
race disadvantages litigants who believe—perhaps with good reason, perhaps not 
—that the racial composition of their jury matters quite a bit to the outcome of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See supra Part I.B. 
 169. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 170. Id. at 89. Though Batson dealt solely with the actions of prosecutors in criminal ac-
tions, Batson has since been extended to any party in civil and criminal cases. Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (Batson applies to strikes made by criminal defendants); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (Batson applies in civil cases). 
The Batson regime also applies in cases of sex-based peremptory challenges. J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S 127, 145 (1994). 
 171. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
 172. Id. at 89 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Conn. 1976)). 
 173. As noted above, another example of this occurs when courts prevent legislatures from 
using race as a factor even when it genuinely is the lowest-cost and most efficient proxy for a 
characteristic Congress might legitimately wish to legislate on. See supra notes 119–20 and 
accompanying text. 
 174. See Robar v. LaBuda, 921 N.Y.S.2d 710, 718 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that, while 
hunting is a constitutionally protected activity, Batson nonetheless does not prevent striking a 
juror due to their exercise of that activity). 
 175. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (confirming that lawyers “may in-
clude [jurors’] group affiliations” in making the decision to utilize a peremptory strike), 
overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 176. Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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case.177 A world where race is treated the same as any other “irrelevant” characteris-
tics is not one in which race is never used at all. Rather, it represents a determination 
that the usages of race are sufficiently idiosyncratic that we don’t think they represent 
a severe threat to a just social order. Individualized use of race—as in by persons 
making peremptory strikes of jurors—is perfectly okay, the same as if one struck a 
juror because one didn’t like their hairstyle.178 
Though peremptory challenges can partially simulate a world in which race has 
become indistinguishable from other identity axes, it cannot do so entirely. The de-
bate over Batson remains highly race conscious.179 In part, this is because it is diffi-
cult to imagine what it would look like for such a fraught identity to completely re-
cede into normalcy—essentially, an America that has collectively forgotten what 
race once meant. Is there any example of something like that occurring? 
A surprising analogy might exist with respect to the treatment of hereditary pref-
erences and the Titles of Nobility Clauses.180 In 2006, Carlton F.W. Larson made the 
provocative argument that the Titles of Nobility Clauses forbid legacy preferences in 
public university admissions.181 In doing so, he had to contend with the widespread 
notion that the bar on nobility titles is the paradigmatic example of a crystal-clear 
constitutional clause,182 which today could only be invoked by “cranks and mis-
fits.”183 Legacy preferences, for their part, are seen as a quintessential “easy case” 
—at least as far as constitutional law is concerned. The plaintiffs in the Michigan 
affirmative-action case quickly conceded that legacy preferences for alumni were 
constitutional,184 and Justice Thomas likewise distinguished legacy preferences from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 60–61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (“I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this Court ventured 
down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory strikes. . . . Simply 
stated, securing representation of the defendant’s race on the jury may help to overcome racial 
bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.”); Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The effect of to-
day’s decision . . . will be . . . that the minority defendant can no longer seek to prevent an all-
white jury, or to seat as many jurors of his own race as possible. . . . So in criminal cases, 
today’s decision represents a net loss to the minority litigant.”). 
 178. But see McCrea v. Gheraibeh, 669 S.E.2d 333, 335 (S.C. 2008) (holding that striking 
a juror for wearing dreadlocks did not constitute a race-neutral rationale). 
 179. See supra note 177. 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”). 
 181. Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the Un-
constitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1375 (2006). More than twenty years earlier, Richard Delgado made a similar, though broader, 
plea for a revitalized Titles of Nobility Clause jurisprudence. Richard Delgado, Inequality 
“From the Top”: Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive 
Justice, 32 UCLA L. REV. 100 (1984). 
 182. See Diane P. Wood, Our 18th Century Constitution in the 21st Century World, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (2005) (distinguishing the Titles of Nobility Clauses from the ma-
jority of constitutional doctrines, which, she claims, invite serious legal contestation). 
 183. Larson, supra note 181, at 1379 (“Titles of nobility? Surely only cranks and misfits 
invoke the Nobility Clauses in constitutional argument.”). 
 184. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
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racial ones as the sort of preferential treatment that is clearly constitutionally 
permissible.185 
Why does the Titles of Nobility Clause argument against legacy preferences strike 
most of us as intuitively ridiculous? One answer is that legacy preferences don’t carry 
with them a traditional noble title, such as duke or countess.186 But the bigger issue 
is that the idea of a true American aristocracy seems absurd in the twenty-first cen-
tury. The idea of noble families and royal bloodlines is preposterous. Unlike the  
eighteenth-century Europe that America was attempting to distinguish itself from, a 
system of formal hereditary privilege is not today a significant site of political and 
social conflict and controversy.187 
But this was not always the case. At the time of the founding, the prospect of a 
hereditary aristocratic elite was a serious and salient threat. Consequently, Larson 
contends that the Titles of Nobility Clauses, far from being narrow and mostly extra-
neous prohibitions, were originally understood in broad, prophylactic terms—bar-
ring any sort of preference based on ancestry.188 He recounts the controversy over 
the 1783 creation of the Society of the Cincinnati, an organization for Continental 
Army officers.189 Today, this sort of fraternal order would pass with little notice, and 
it might not have been objectionable in the late eighteenth century either, except that 
membership passed down to the officers’ heirs.190 Membership did not exactly lead 
to a lifetime of privilege and luxury; it carried with it “little more than . . . a hereditary 
right to wear a ribbon.”191 Nonetheless, the hereditary nature of the order caused a 
torrent of objections to pour out: it was “an hereditary peerage,”192 “contrary to the 
confederation of the United States, and the spirit of the constitution of this common-
wealth,”193 and a “dangerous” group that was “generative of suspicion, jealousy, di-
vision and domestick [sic] discord.”194 These objections—which were made with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 186. But see Larson, supra note 181, at 1379–81 (rejecting the notion that this clause was 
historically understood to apply simply to particular titles). 
 187. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 22 (2011) (“[S]o effective was the social transformation brought on by the American 
Revolution that these [nobility] clauses soon became superfluous, a distant echo of a world 
and a form of social inequality entirely strange to us.”). 
 188. Larson, supra note 181, at 1383–408; see infra Part III.B (defending the use of 
prophylactic bans in situations where the relevant conflict is extremely robust and the likeli-
hood the underlying classification will be used for malign purposes is strong). 
 189. Larson, supra note 181, at 1387–95. At this time, of course, America was governed 
by the Articles of Confederation, which contained its own analogous clause barring titles of 
nobility. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 1 (prohibiting “the United States 
in congress assembled, or any of [the states]” from granting “any title of nobility”). 
 190. Larson, supra note 181, at 1387–88. 
 191. Id. at 1400. 
 192. “CASSIUS” [AEDANUS BURKE], CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SOCIETY OR ORDER OF 
CINCINNATI 7 (Charleston, A. Timothy 1783) (emphasis omitted). 
 193. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Feb. 21, 1784), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 142, 143 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig 
eds., 1992) (quoting an act of the Massachusetts Senate). 
 194. Extracts from the Speech of the Governor of South Carolina to the General Assembly, 
SALEM GAZETTE, Apr. 8, 1784, at 3. 
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specific reference to the Articles of Confederation’s proscription on titles of nobil-
ity—surfaced across political and partisan lines, unifying widely divergent American 
statesmen in their opposition to the order.195 
In the eighteenth century, the prospect of a hereditary aristocracy that would rep-
resent a systematic deviation from liberal, egalitarian norms was not something hy-
pothetical—it was something all Americans would be familiar with as an organizing 
principle in England as well as continental Europe. Because the danger was very real, 
Americans responded by crafting a broadly prophylactic constitutional norm guard-
ing against any sort of hereditary privilege. “How would these Americans have re-
acted if the federal government or a state had opened and funded an exclusive uni-
versity to which admission was linked, even in part, to hereditary privilege? . . . [T]he 
answer is obvious—they would have resisted it with every fiber of their being.”196 
Today, the prospect of a true familial aristocracy seems remote, and so there is no 
need for such drastic measures. Legacy preferences represent an extremely isolated 
and idiosyncratic usage of heredity as part of the allocation of social privileges. This 
is not to say that legacy preferences are not controversial—of course they are.197 But 
they are not met with the full force and fury of constitutional law as they apparently 
would have been at the time of the nation’s founding.198 For better or for worse, they 
have been devolved back into “normal” politics.199 Legacy preferences may be 
wrong, but they do not run the risk of recreating a European aristocracy, and thus, 
constitutionally speaking, we do not treat them that way.200 The form of social con-
flict that gave rise to the Titles of Nobility Clauses has disappeared nearly entirely; 
hence, the sporadic reemergence of hereditary preferences in the present day does 
not carry with it a blanket proscription akin to strict scrutiny. 
It is possible race could see the same evolution—with the history of racial strife 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. Larson, supra note 181, at 1400 (“The Society was little more than a private fraternity 
of retired public officials with a hereditary right to wear a ribbon. Yet it was denounced as 
illegitimate and inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation by people who disagreed about 
almost everything else.” (footnote omitted)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITY AND 
EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (2005) (reporting that three-quarters of 
Americans disapprove of legacy preferences in college admissions). 
 198. Fourteenth Amendment challenges to allegedly nepotistic state laws have also found-
ered. See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563–64 (1947) (upholding 
a Louisiana statute which effectively restricted the licensing of new river pilots only to friends 
and relatives of existing pilots); Ellebracht v. Police Bd. of the Metro. Police Dep’t, 137 F.3d 
563, 566 (8th Cir. 1998) (turning back an equal-protection challenge even where concededly 
“[f]amilial and political influence may have played some role in the promotion process”). But 
see Backlund v. Hessen, 104 F.3d 1031, 1033–34 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Kotch still 
requires that a rational basis be shown for nepotistic classifications). 
 199. See Schraub, Unsuspecting, supra note 5, at 367 (arguing that the entire point of 
suspect-classification doctrine is for the protected groups to eventually be able to return to the 
normal “rough-and-tumble” of standard democratic politics). 
 200. Cf. FORD, supra note 56, at 159 (conceding that appearance discrimination exists but 
discounting the case for treating it like racial discrimination because it has not historically or 
contemporaneously been as severe as racial strife and because it has not systematically pre-
vented the disadvantaged group from securing political or economic success). 
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and conflict receding so far into the background that it is nearly forgotten.201 In this 
case, race would appear in American public life extremely rarely, and when it did it 
would be seen more as a perplexing idiosyncrasy than as a grave threat to the social 
order. It might still prove controversial, just as legacy preferences are controversial, 
and just as an employer who openly stated she did not wish to hire an “ugly” em-
ployee might be controversial.202 But in all cases, this controversy would not be seen 
as rising to the hypertrophic level necessitating something like strict scrutiny. 
2. Dialing Race Back—According Race Intermediate Scrutiny 
The story laid out above—whereby race recedes so far from the public eye that 
we effectively forget it ever was a problem—may seem implausible. But it is hardly 
necessary to take an all-or-nothing approach. The public salience of race exists upon 
a continuum—even if we find it hard to envision that the risk of racial strife will 
entirely disappear such that it approximates the risk of European feudalism, we might 
still believe that it is no longer so central to American life that it requires the most 
stringent oversight available in American constitutional law. Another alternative is 
to begin slowly dialing back the special protections race receives.203 American con-
stitutional law already possesses an intermediate tier between strict scrutiny and the 
baseline of rational basis.204 In contrast to strict scrutiny, which requires that the chal-
lenged statute be “narrowly tailored” in pursuit of a “compelling governmental in-
terest[],”205 intermediate scrutiny is more relaxed with regard to both means and 
ends. To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the law in question “must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”206 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. See Barnes et al., supra note 58, at 978 (noting the possibility that race could become 
something noticed but entirely benign, while implying that this is not an accurate assessment 
of the status quo). 
 202. FORD, supra note 56, at 134–39 (detailing a San Francisco hotel which specifically 
vetted employment candidates on basis of appearance and the debate over a Santa Cruz ordi-
nance banning appearance-based discrimination). 
 203. While others have proposed applying intermediate scrutiny to certain types of (be-
nign) racial classifications, see supra note 6, no one, to my knowledge, has contemplated 
transitioning all racial classifications to this standard. 
 204. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing what would come to be 
known as intermediate scrutiny as a middle tier applied to sex classifications). 
 205. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 206. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. The language of this test has varied somewhat from case to 
case. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (stating that the justification 
for a sex classification measured under intermediate scrutiny must be “exceedingly persua-
sive” (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))); Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (criticizing a reformulation of the intermediate-scrutiny language as 
establishing “intermediate-intermediate scrutiny”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (observing that a legislative classification reviewed under in-
termediate scrutiny must be “substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental 
interest”); see also Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as 
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998) (observing that the intermediate 
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As noted above, the mechanics by which particular classifications are allocated 
strict, intermediate, or rational-basis scrutiny are notoriously opaque.207 Nonetheless, 
the organizing principle behind the entire doctrine strongly implies that increased 
political integration should begin a process of ratcheting down the “extraordinary” 
political protection represented by strict scrutiny.208 Insofar as the ultimate goal of 
all discrimination law can be described as integrating racial minorities into “normal” 
politics—the failure of which prompts heightened judicial solicitude of minorities in 
the first place209—it stands to reason that the increased standing of racial minorities 
in American society should eventually lead racial classifications to become normal-
ized with respect to the degree of judicial scrutiny they are afforded. 
Note that making this observation does not mean that strict scrutiny was never the 
proper standard by which to evaluate racial classifications, or even that it is not the 
proper standard today. Rather, what it reveals is that the application of strict scrutiny 
to racial classifications necessarily requires a particular evaluation of race in 
America—one in which race acts as a serious, constant, and systematic source of 
political, social, or economic deprivation (in other words, one in which we are quite 
far from being post-racial). The state of affairs in the Jim Crow South clearly met 
this burden; our current status quo may or may not. It is the outcome of this appraisal 
that then warrants a series of race-conscious interventions into legislative activity 
—such as demanding that any racial classifications meet the high burden of being 
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. But there is a hydraulic relationship 
at work—the more fervently we are willing to argue we are “post-racial,” the less 
justifiable it becomes to continue according race the exceptional protections 
represented by strict scrutiny. 
How would our race jurisprudence change if intermediate scrutiny were the gov-
erning doctrine detailing governmental use of race? In many of the highest profile 
cases, the likely answer is, “It wouldn’t.”210 Many of the historical cases—such as 
Brown v. Board of Education211 or Loving v. Virginia212—would not change, because 
strict scrutiny was clearly the appropriate method of approach for racial classification 
at that time period.213 But suppose a contemporary legislature, operating under 
                                                                                                                 
 
scrutiny test and language have “been particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the Supreme 
Court”). 
 207. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 208. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 209. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see supra notes 
87–89 and accompanying text. 
 210. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, Justice Kennedy predicted that permitting inter-
mediate scrutiny to control even benign racial classifications “would validate . . . any number 
of future racial classifications the Government may find useful.” 497 U.S. 547, 633–34 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, he did not cite a single example save Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1943)—a case which, as Justice Kennedy concedes, affirmed a racial 
classification via strict scrutiny. Metro Broad., 497 U.S at 633. 
 211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 212. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 213. There is a near tautology here—the very fact that a society has antimiscegenation 
laws, or pervasive de jure school segregation, is the strongest possible proof that a society is 
so deeply infected with racist sentiment so as to require constant, extraordinary judicial 
oversight akin to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is appropriate in Loving because having a law 
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intermediate-scrutiny review, did pass a law mandating segregation of schools or 
barring interracial marriage. It seems quite unlikely that such laws would be deemed 
to either be in pursuit of an important governmental objective or be substantially tied 
to such a purpose.214 In United States v. Virginia,215 the Supreme Court struck down 
sex-segregated educational facilities in the state of Virginia under intermediate-
scrutiny review.216 In the context of gay-marriage litigation, few believed that re-
stricting marriage to heterosexual couples could survive heightened scrutiny.217 
Many, if not all, of the most egregious racial injustices would be blocked under 
heightened scrutiny as much as they are under strict scrutiny. 
In other contexts, the shift would have little impact because strict scrutiny has 
never been held to apply in the first place. The use of race as part of a criminal suspect 
profile, for instance, has never been considered a “racial classification” subject to 
strict scrutiny.218 This carve-out has been harshly criticized,219 but for better or for 
                                                                                                                 
 
barring interracial marriage is symbolic of the conditions whereby strict scrutiny can be 
justified. 
 214. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 215. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 216. Id. at 519. 
 217. This is now mostly a moot issue, as Obergefell v. Hodges struck down bans on same-
sex marriage without referencing the issue of tiered scrutiny at all. 135 S. Ct. 2585 (2015); see 
also Schraub, Siren Song, supra note 5, at 864–67 (describing the implications of the Court 
declining to rely on strict scrutiny for its decision). However, lower courts which applied in-
termediate scrutiny universally concluded that same-sex marriage bans could not stand. See, 
e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476–81 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896–906 (Iowa 2009). Once the federal government concluded that 
intermediate scrutiny properly applied to sexual-orientation-based classifications, it likewise 
found that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was incontestably unconstitutional under that 
standard of review. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip 
/legacy/2014/07/23/02-23-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/E32U-K25J]. Lower courts did uphold 
restrictions on gay marriage, but only after finding that rational basis is the proper standard of 
review. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 606 (Md. 2007) (declining to apply 
heightened scrutiny and upholding the prohibition on gay marriage); Hernandez v. Robles, 
855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 218. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337–38 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In acting 
on the description provided by the victim of the assault—a description that included race as 
one of several elements—defendants did not engage in a suspect racial classification that 
would draw strict scrutiny. The description, which originated not with the state but with the 
victim, was a legitimate classification within which potential suspects might be found.”); 
United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 354 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “the decision 
to investigate someone [of a particular race] based on a tip from a source outside the police 
organization” does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 
170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Obviously race or ethnic background may become a legitimate 
consideration when investigators have information on this subject about a particular suspect.”). 
 219. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1109 (2001) (“To conclude that 
race-based suspect descriptions should not be treated as a racial classification because they 
seem useful or justified would be to engage in precisely the sort of threshold substantive 
evaluation that the doctrinal structure forecloses, and that the Supreme Court has explicitly 
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worse strict scrutiny does not occupy the field in this area of law. “Disparate impact” 
claims are another area which have not been governed by strict scrutiny—mere ra-
cially disproportionate impacts, absent discriminatory purposes, are not the subject 
of constitutional proscription.220 Laws which specifically target race-conscious pol-
icy making by college administrators likewise do not appear to fall under strict scru-
tiny’s gaze.221 
One arena which would probably see a substantial change would be in “benign” 
racial classifications—those designed to foster racial inclusion and equality rather 
than stymie it. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that 
benign racial classifications were subject to intermediate, rather than strict, scru-
tiny.222 This decision was soon reversed in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
which created a blanket policy applying strict scrutiny in all cases.223 Neither the 
dissenters in Metro Broadcasting nor the majority in Adarand argued that the chal-
lenged affirmative action programs should fail under intermediate scrutiny—their 
claim was purely that this was an inappropriate standard of review.224 The action in 
these cases was entirely along the heightened/strict scrutiny axis—consequently, it 
seems likely that affirmative action programs would survive constitutional scrutiny. 
This conclusion, of course, does not mean that intermediate scrutiny is norma-
tively superior to strict scrutiny as a doctrinal framework for race cases. After all, 
many believe that affirmative action programs are deeply wrongful (if not danger-
ous).225 For these people, a doctrinal approach which prohibits de jure segregation 
and race-conscious integration efforts would be greatly preferable to one which only 
bars the former. However, given the ever-expanding doctrinal incoherency between 
how the courts describe the criterion for becoming a suspect class and how they de-
pict the current state of racial affairs,226 it does indicate that the seemingly permanent 
                                                                                                                 
 
disavowed.” (emphasis in original)). 
 220. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the 
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially dis-
criminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate im-
pact.” (emphasis in original)); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264–65 (1977) (applying the Davis disparate-impact test, as opposed to strict scrutiny, in 
a case alleging disparate impact). 
 221. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1625 (2014). 
 222. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 223. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold today that all racial classifications . . . must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. . . . To the extent that Metro Broadcasting 
is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.”). 
 224. Id. at 226–27 (deciding to overrule Metro Broadcasting on the grounds that interme-
diate scrutiny is never appropriate to apply to racial classifications); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 
at 603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s application of a lessened equal protection 
standard . . . finds no support in our cases or in the Constitution.”); id. at 633 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (critiquing the majority for “abandoning strict scrutiny”). 
 225. See, e.g., Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 609 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“‘“Benign” racial 
classification’ is a contradiction in terms. Governmental distinctions among citizens based on 
race or ethnicity, even in the rare circumstances permitted by our cases, exact costs and carry 
with them substantial dangers.”). 
 226. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
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elevation of racial classifications to strict-scrutiny status is motivated not by any for-
malistic requirements, but rather by a normative commitment to a particular, color-
blind approach to racial policymaking.227 In other words, affirmative action programs 
are not usually unconstitutional because they fail strict scrutiny, rather, strict scrutiny 
is applied to affirmative action programs because it ensures that such policies are 
usually struck down.  
Such results-oriented decisionmaking is indicative that the Justices in question 
consider questions of race and racial policy as being possessed of exceptional nor-
mative importance. Otherwise, there would be no need to contort the doctrine to fit 
their preferred policy prescriptions. But the very fact that these normative commit-
ments run deep enough to move a Supreme Court majority is difficult to square with 
the belief that race is meaningfully receding in public importance. The decision to 
maintain strict scrutiny in these cases—despite the fact that doing so appears to inject 
race into American jurisprudence in a manner deeply incompatible with post-racial 
ambitions—in effect represents a concession that America never will rise beyond 
race and that the risks of eliminating a flat prophylactic rule remain, and perhaps 
always will remain, too high to begin the process of removing race from its doctri-
nally superordinate position. It is to this possibility that I now turn. 
B. Strict Scrutiny as a Second-Best Solution 
If strict scrutiny is fundamentally inconsistent with post-racial ambitions, why 
ever have it? One answer is that strict scrutiny is justified whenever any usage of 
race will have (or likely have) predominantly negative effects. Here, strict scrutiny 
serves a prophylactic function—barring the use of race in (nearly) all cases based on 
a considered judgment that the risks of mistakenly permitting malevolent (in intent 
or effect) classifications are high enough to warrant a virtual per se rule against 
them.228 This was the argument made by Justice O’Connor in City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co.229: without “searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 
‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate 
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”230 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. See, e.g., Book Note, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
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Any sort of ambivalence regarding the permissibility of race-conscious actions 
runs the risk of showing “deference to discriminators.”231 If there are very few per-
sons who are attempting to discriminate, this risk may be negligible. If racism is 
rampant in society, by contrast, it is far more likely that the average use of race by a 
decisionmaker will be malignant in motive or effect (regardless of whether it is pub-
licly characterized as salutary or hostile). In situations where the political use of race 
is solely (or nearly exclusively) to divide and subordinate, strict scrutiny makes sense 
even recognizing that some truly beneficent usages may be foreclosed.232 And in-
deed, the same psychological research which warned about the potentially counter-
productive effects of asking persons to “suppress” race233 also noted that such strate-
gies tend to be more effective—or at least, more likely to see gains outweighing 
losses—amongst persons who are relatively high in prejudice.234 After all, if the 
worry is that suppressing race also involves suppressing uses of race that may help 
overcome, rather than buttress, racial prejudice, highly prejudiced individuals have 
the “advantage” of possessing fewer positive racial ideals in the first place.235 
The above case, of course, rests upon a specific appraisal about the salience of 
race in American society. It is an appraisal that is clearly on the mark as applied to 
certain chapters of our history, such as Jim Crow. But by its terms it is temporally 
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variant—if the malignant influence of race recedes, then the need for prophylactic 
measures recedes along with it.236 To recognize strict scrutiny as the best legal doc-
trine for combating the conditions prevailing in America at the time of Jim Crow is 
not to endorse it in perpetuity.237 
So what does it mean to entrench strict scrutiny as a permanent feature of our 
jurisprudence? It is to say that the pervasiveness of racial prejudice is an indelible 
state of affairs—race will perpetually be too dangerous to use, and it will always 
stoke the fires of racialized resentment and conflict.238 This position, that racism may 
be a permanent feature of American political life, is most associated with critical race 
theory founder Derrick Bell.239 However, there are some indications that persons 
whose perspectives on race diverge drastically from Professor Bell’s are similarly 
skeptical of ever dissolving the terrifying moral force of race. Justice Scalia warned 
his colleagues that any departure from the colorblind principle necessarily involves 
“play[ing] with fire.”240 Race is and ever will be perpetually dangerous, and this is 
something America will never transcend. 
More systematically, this perspective has deep roots in conservative Black politi-
cal thought. The mid-twentieth-century Black conservative writer George Schuyler 
opened his autobiography by asserting that racial disadvantage is “an unalterable cir-
cumstance” in a world dominated by White people.241 “[T]here is, and always will 
be, a color caste system in the United States”; hence, Black political strategy should 
“concentrate on how to best survive and prosper within that system.”242 From that 
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 240. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment) (“When we depart from [the colorblind] principle we play with fire, and much 
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 242. Id. at 121–22. 
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vantage point, it makes perfect sense to promote a blanket rule barring the use of race 
in any and all cases.  
Likewise, this view seems to accord with Justice Thomas’s views on race in 
America.243 Justice Thomas harbors no delusions that racism has been extinguished 
in American life. To the contrary, he has been very forthright in recounting the con-
siderable amount of racism he has personally experienced and overcome to reach his 
current position,244 racially motivated hostility which continues to inflect the public’s 
perception of his performance as a Supreme Court Justice.245 But for Thomas, this 
belief in the continuing power of racism in America counsels greater wariness about 
official use of race. Early in his life, he was heavily influenced by a law school friend 
who asked him, “Clarence, as a member of a group that has been treated shabbily by 
the majority in this country, why would you want to give the government more power 
over your personal life?”246 In his Parents Involved concurrence, Thomas warned his 
colleagues that “if our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of 
elites bearing racial theories.”247 These claims do not rely on our progress at eradi-
cating race as a meaningful social problem but on deep skepticism that we have done 
so or ever will do so. 
This is a perfectly cohesive position. But we need to be clear about what we are 
giving up. Post-racialism, as an aspiration, cannot survive a world in which racism 
is a permanent feature of our politics. Strict scrutiny in perpetuity effectively states 
that race is, in fact, something we’ll never get beyond. 
C. Race Without Fear 
To this point, my focus has been primarily on the applications and limitations of 
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 247. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780–81 
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strict-scrutiny doctrine. There is a deep confusion in strict-scrutiny doctrine—it pur-
ports to pursue a post-racial world, but it cannot get us there. As outlined in the pre-
vious section, one answer is simply to give up the dream—race will always be with 
us and always be dangerous, and thus strict scrutiny will always be necessary as a 
bulwark against it. 
This may be coherent, but it is also deeply unsatisfactory. The desire to become 
post-racial speaks to something very real in the American psyche, and it is not one I 
think we should cast aside lightly. In this final section, I circle back to our concept 
of post-racialism and ask, “What exactly are we trying to get ‘post’?” I argue that the 
problem which motivates the post-racial impulse is not the category of race itself, 
but rather, fear of the strife and conflict associated with race. That is what we wish 
to get beyond—the goal, in Adorno’s words, is not necessarily for racial difference 
to end but for society to be a place where we can be “different without fear.”248 And 
there are, and in other contexts the Supreme Court has recognized, alternative paths 
to that end beyond brute suppression of race as a category.  
1. The Trailblazers: Religion and Indigenous Status 
Fear is an ongoing theme of racial discourse in America. To play with race is to 
“play with fire.”249 Even the slightest retreat from strict scrutiny puts us back on the 
path to Korematsu,250 or Plessy.251 When race enters the discussion, one has to “walk 
on eggshells,” and a single mistake or misstatement carries with it catastrophic 
consequences.252 And because until very recently, race-conscious behavior was “the 
primary means of maintaining the supremacy of whites,”253 many Americans are un-
derstandably wary about drawing again from that well, even with the most salutary 
motives. We go to extraordinary, sometimes ridiculous lengths to avoid having to 
make any conscious acknowledgment of race in public.254 
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But what we’re afraid of isn’t some abstraction—“race”—or even the prospect of 
human beings defining themselves along racial lines. The worry refers to what Neil 
Siegel calls racial “balkanization”: “the extent to which Americans identify as mem-
bers of separate racial or ethnic groups that view one another with hostility.”255 And 
the reason this particular axis of differentiation is presumed to be associated with 
hostile interrelations is because of the very specific history of domination and subju-
gation that characterized the role of race in American life.256  
The fact of racial oppression (not just identification) is thus critical. To say that 
the problem with segregation was simply that state education statutes used the word 
“Negro” is to badly miss the point. Segregation was wrong because it was part and 
parcel of a centuries-long structure of massive, race-based oppression. In this, it is 
hardly alone—regrettably, many identity axes other than race have had similar his-
tories of violence and conflict. Yet in many of these cases, our political response—
while committed to subduing the fires—has not even remotely approximated the sup-
pressive “strict scrutiny” regime. Religion and indigenous status are two examples 
of characteristics deeply enmeshed in such histories where courts have been willing, 
to various extents, to permit government acknowledgment and recognition of the un-
derlying identities. 
The story of much of Western social history is one of religious conflict, but the 
idea of a “religion-blind” Constitution is controversial, at best.257 Courts have been 
far more tolerant of government “noticing” religion in order to rectify substantive 
inequalities than they have been in racial contexts.258 The United States is mandated 
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to be neutral towards religion, but this is understood as a “benevolent neutrality”259 
permitting government to recognize and foster religious observance in ways deeply 
at odds with a purely formalist paradigm. This benevolence enables government to, 
for instance, exempt religious properties from taxation260 and certain anti-
discrimination provisions261 and in general grants legislatures some latitude in ac-
commodating religious practitioners burdened by generally applicable rules.262  
Unlike the “benign” racial classifications which were asserted to be nonexistent 
by Justice O’Connor,263 courts are up-front in acknowledging the possibility of at 
least limited governmental recognition of religion and religious needs. And what’s 
more, this treatment is explicitly tied to the historical risk of religious discrimina-
tion—in other words, as a legislative tool for mitigating, rather than stoking, the fires 
of religious conflict.264 Cognizant of a severe history of religious discrimination, 
courts nonetheless are willing to recognize—subject to oversight and limits—the 
utility of allowing government to pay heed to religious difference in the service of 
fostering religious pluralism.265 
The United States’s treatment of Native Americans has likewise been character-
ized by more than its fair share of brutality, yet the jurisprudence surrounding “race-
conscious” preferences for Native Americans rather famously diverges from that ac-
corded to racial classifications more generally.266 Our categorization of Native 
Americans is a “conscious” one, treating indigenousness as an independent identity 
that is explicitly noted and recognized. This differentiation from race (legally speak-
ing) is traceable at least to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, which designated Indian 
tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”267 And—in stark contrast to the track of 
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race—oftentimes the law affirmatively requires Native American tribes to retain a 
(very particular sort of) distinctiveness in order to access legal privileges.268 
Such a political categorization rendered Indian tribes quite distinct from racial 
groups, as “nations” remain valid sites for social identification in a way race has 
not.269 Federal policy towards Indian tribes since the Nixon administration has em-
phasized respecting Indian political autonomy and their right to communal self-
governance free of outside interference.270 As strict scrutiny began to monopolize 
race’s legal playing field, the “political” nature of Indian status became the crucial 
distinction enabling “Indian-conscious” programs to survive.271 And the primary lo-
cus of political struggle for Native Americans has not been to be seen as “not Indian” 
but rather to have their own conception of Indianness given legal weight and 
meaning.272 
Noting the doctrinal vitality of government noticing religion and indigenous sta-
tus is not to say there is universal agreement in either of these two contexts. People 
do defend a “religion-blind” conception of public life,273 and likewise the seemingly 
exceptional treatment of Native Americans compared to the norm established by 
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current equal protection jurisprudence has also been opposed in some quarters.274 But 
it is fair to say that in both cases, a mechanism for transcending a divisive past that 
does not rely on simply suppressing the offending identity is at least part of the 
mainstream conversation. If the problem is delineating groups by a hierarchy of 
privilege and subordination, one solution is simply to try and obliterate the group 
identities in question. But another is to pursue a vision of equality where citizens do 
not leverage group difference into a basis for social oppression. 
2. Transcending Racial Fear 
Religion and indigenous status both provide a model for how historically fraught 
identities can be utilized while nonetheless moving us “beyond” their dangerous 
pasts. For race, however, this move is considerably more controversial. Still, there is 
no reason to think that race will be implacably resistant to this sort of cultural re-
framing. Racial identity exists and is important to many. The task of turning it from 
something that is solely associated with misery and oppression into something that 
can be safely celebrated and appreciated may be difficult, but it is not impossible. 
As Iris Marion Young observes, one of the great missed predictions of the modern 
era has been the assumption that the extension of formal equal rights would lead to 
a decline in persons identifying with particular groups.275 This, to put it mildly, has 
not been the case.276 A history of social differentiation creates significant group dif-
ferences—linguistic, cultural, political, and otherwise—and it is no easy thing to 
wipe the slate clean.277 More to the point, it is unclear that we would always want 
to—at least with respect to distinctions that are not intrinsically related to differences 
in material outcomes or access to opportunity. The historical processes by which 
identities are formed are often tragic, but that does not mean that they create nothing 
of worth. It is often quite important to people who are members of social groups with 
long histories of oppression that they commemorate, even celebrate, how their an-
cestors persevered and created meaningful lives through adversity.278 These identi-
ties have value and can be worth preserving even if their creation came in the teeth 
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of the very sort of prejudice we all are trying to transcend. “Pasts we inherit affect 
who we become.”279 
Race, in particular, has developed a cultural resonance that renders it more than 
mere phenotype. Richard Ford argues that Justice Powell’s “difference splitting” 
opinion in Bakke—permitting affirmative action insofar as it was in pursuit of diver-
sity—“altered the incentives surrounding racial identity and thereby altered perfor-
mance of racial identity.”280 Consequently, the cultural identity of a racial minority 
replaced a conceptualization of race dominated by a history of experiencing rac-
ism.281 In this formulation, race begins to approximate religion in terms of how its 
membership understands its affiliation with the identity axis.282 I would dispute both 
that the cultural conception of race was birthed by Bakke,283 as well as that the expe-
rience of racist domination cannot itself help forge a cultural identity.284 But insofar 
as racial identity possesses religion-like characteristics, it stands to reason that many 
people will value their racial identities and want them (sometimes) recognized the 
same as government (sometimes) recognizes religious identities. 
I noted towards the beginning that the relationship between post-racialism and 
colorblindness is more complicated than is typically recognized and that one can 
imagine ways of transcending race that do not rely on ignoring the way race is in-
scribed in our daily lives.285 Lani Guinier writes: 
My view is that it is premature to deny those [racial] differences when 
they are so important to so many people. That is not to say that you want 
ultimately to reinforce those differences as our goal or as our vision. But 
it does mean that if you are going to get people to the point where they 
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can converse together and communicate across these differences, the first 
thing that you have to do is respect and recognize those differences. And 
having respected and recognized those differences, in my experience, 
you will find that people are much more willing to engage in conversa-
tion about the common good and about our common interests because 
their differences don't become so key to their self-definition. You have 
already recognized and respected those differences, so every conversa-
tion doesn’t have to be about those differences which you’ve already rec-
ognized and respected. It’s a way of transcending race ultimately. But in 
order get there, you must first recognize race.286 
Race remains an important locus of identity for many people. Recognizing and re-
specting that is the first step in rendering it something that is not the focus of every 
political discussion. And in that way, race becomes normalized and familiar—the 
sort of identity we have ample experience in mediating and managing so it does not 
instill so much fear and anxiety within the polity. 
Obviously, racial minorities want to “get beyond” a world in which they are at 
risk of systematic discrimination, oppression, and marginalization; just as Jews do 
not want to worry about being victimized by another Holocaust, just as Native 
Americans do not want to feel on the cusp of a new Trail of Tears.287 And because 
all people, the relatively advantaged included, are concerned about being just and 
fair to persons of diverse backgrounds, racial majorities often care quite a lot about 
not living in that world as well.288 But this concern is very separate from saying that 
race, or religion, or indigenous status, must be thrown away by virtue of its associa-
tion with these evils. Post-racialism, stripped to the essence, should be about trans-
cending racial oppression, not the cultural existence of race. If race could be rendered 
something akin to (an idealized vision of) religion in liberal societies—an identity 
that people possess, that people are proud of, that is flexible enough to adapt to their 
own preferences and outlooks, and that can be talked about and deliberated over 
without worrying about recreating conditions of domination and misery—that would 
be a massive moral victory and psychological break from our precarious status quo.289 
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Because this vision of post-racialism is not hostile to the mere recognition of race, 
it would not suffer from the inherent tension between the orthodox post-racial ambi-
tion of eliminating race altogether and strict scrutiny’s elevation of it to hyper-
salience.290 People organize and associate along all sorts of axes, most of which are 
seen as unexceptional levers of normal political action.291 The vast majority of iden-
tities we hold are “noticed” by law at certain points and ignored at others. And so, 
like other race-conscious procedures, it would remain perfectly sensible to apply 
strict scrutiny in discrete areas where the use of race appears to be particularly per-
nicious or offensive to our normative commitments respecting racial equality.292 
Law’s intersection with culture is rarely governed by hard-and-fast rules. We some-
times want law to intervene to enable social or cultural choices that otherwise would 
be closed to us, and we sometimes want law to step back and leave us alone. Race is 
abnormal insofar as it is denied this flexibility; it is seen instead as something that 
must be hermetically sealed off from politics.293 A post-racial world would be one in 
which this aberration has been healed.  
CONCLUSION 
Strict scrutiny has a role to play in securing racial justice. But its connection to 
“post-racialism” is far more complicated than is typically acknowledged. It is an un-
stated assumption of American constitutional law that, while other race-specific po-
litical and legal programs ought to disappear with time, strict scrutiny can exist in 
perpetuity with no measurable effect on the course of American race relations.  
This assumption cannot hold. Strict scrutiny elevates race to an exceptional role 
in American law, one which effectively guarantees we will not “get beyond” race. 
Moreover, unlike other race-conscious remedies, the Supreme Court does not seem 
to have placed any temporal limit on the use of strict scrutiny—rendering it the 
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epitome of one “that [is] ageless in [its] reach into the past, and timeless in [its] ability 
to affect the future.”294 One can imagine a racial jurisprudence that is informed by 
post-racial ambitions, but it is one that looks very little like modern strict scrutiny 
doctrine.295 
One response to this problem is to concede that race is never something we will 
get beyond. The risk of racial strife and discord is, and will always be, too high to 
permit its usage by public actors. Intellectually, this position is perfectly coherent; 
but it carries with it a grave sacrifice—a world which is never post-racial, where race 
is always lurking as a menacing threat to the social order.296 But there is an alterna-
tive. We can reimagine “post-racialism” to bring race in line with other historically 
dangerous identities, such as religion or indigenous status. In both of these contexts, 
it is understood that getting beyond historical conflict and chaos does not require 
massive public suppression of the relevant identity. A more nuanced approach is tol-
erated, one which—precisely by recognizing how these identities matter to their 
bearers—normalizes them and helps begin the difficult but necessary process of tran-
sitioning them back into ordinary politics. A post-racial world, in this view, is not 
one in which race disappears, but where race can, if we choose, be part of how we 
identify and organize ourselves without fear that it will always and inexorably lead 
to ruination. 
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